UC-NRLF 


^B    7Mfl    TSE 


THE 
POLITICAL 

SCENE 

AN  ESSAY 

ON  THE  VICTORY 

OF  1918 


BY 

WALTER 

LIPPMANN 


I 


BY  WALTER  LIPPMANN 

THE  POEMS  OF  PAUL  MARIETT 

Edited  with  an  Introduction 

A  PREFACE  TO  POLITICS 

DRIFT  AND  MASTERY 

THE  STAKES  OF  DIPLOMACY 


THE  POLITICAL  SCENE 


An  Essay  on  the  Victory  of  1918 


BY 
WALTER  LIPPMANN 


NEW  YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 
1919 


V 


Copyright,  1919 

BY 

THE  REPUBLIC  PUBLISHING  COMPANY.  Inc. 


Copyright,  1919 

BY 
HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


DEDICATED  TO  THE  MEMORY  OF 
WILLARD  DICKERMAN  STRAIGHT 


402309 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction .:  ix 

CHAPTER 

I.    The  Task  at  Paris     ....  3 

11.     Peace  as  of  January,  191 8        .       .  11 

III.  Absolute  Victory       .       .       .       .  19 

IV.  "  The    Natural    Master    of    the 

House" .29 

V.    The  Covenant 35-^ 

VI.    A  World  Pool 40 

VII.    Alternatives 46 

VIII.    Amendments 54 

IX.    Bolshevism (^ 

X.    The  Test 80 

Appendix  I :  The  World  Conflict  in  its  Rela- 
tion to  American  Democracy  .       .  83 
Appendix  II:  Text  of  the  Proposed  Consti- 
tution of  the  League  of  Nations  .  104 


INTRODUCTION 

ONE  evening  last  December  I  was  talking 
with  an  Italian  scholar  who  had  come 
to  Paris  for  his  government.  The  news  that 
day  was  bad:  outbreaks  on  the  Dalmatian  coast, 
quarrels  between  the  Czechs  and  Poles,  the 
British  elections  at  the  bottom  of  their  deepest 
depression,  and  inspiration  raging  in  the  French 
press.  He  shook  his  head  sympathetically :  "  This 
is  our  old  Europe,  and  you  Americans  must  not 
be  surprised.  We  have  had  our  American  phase, 
but  that  is  over  now  that  the  war  is  finished. 
We  have  been  through  a  frightful  illness,  and 
thought  we  were  going  to  die.  Our  minds 
turned  in  those  days  to  higher  things,  and  along 
came  the  Americans  with  a  perfect  bedside  man- 
ner, entrancing  self-confidence,  the  strength  of 
youth,  and  a  gospel  of  the  simple  life.  We  made 
good  resolutions  as  sick  poets  do.  We  swore 
that  if  we  got  well  this  time,  we  would  stay  well. 
You  know — no  more  city  life,  but  the  country, 
a  cow,  rise  at  dawn,  to  bed  early,  exercise,  fear 


Introduction 


God,  and  listen  to  Woodrow  Wilson.  It  was 
sincere  at  the  time.  Then  Europe  recovered.  It 
put  off  going  to  the  country.  It  paid  a  visit  to 
the  old  haunts,  met  the  old  cronies,  and  felt  most 
awfully  bored  with  the  everlasting  morality  of 
the  Fourteen  Commandments.  A  little  of  that 
goes  a  long  way." 

In  the  essay  which  follows  I  have  tried  to  in- 
dicate some  of  the  reasons  why  my  friend  was 
wrong,  and  why,  if  Europe  is  to  reconstruct  it- 
self in  the  face  of  the  international  revolution, 
the  democracies  of  the  West  must  devote  them- 
selves unreservedly  to  the  making  of  a  coopera- 
tive peace.  For  a  new  Europe  will  emerge  from 
this  war.  That  much  is  certain,  and  the  only 
question  is  whether  it  will  be  organized  at  Paris 
or  disorganized  from  Moscow. 

Three  great  influences  are  at  work  in  the 
world  which  may  briefly  be  described  as  the  Re- 
action, the  Reconstruction,  and  the  Revolution. 
From  them  the  political  scene  is  engendered. 
Behind  the  Reaction  are  those  who  believe  that 
hostile  rivalry  and  recurrent  wars  are  permanent 
European  institutions,  and  that  the  object  of  a 
treaty  of  peace  is  to  secure  as  many  advantages 


Introduction  xi 


for  yourself  and  your  friends  and  put  as  many 
handicaps  on  your  enemies  and  rivals  as  the 
traffic  will  bear.  Thus  you  prepare  yourself  for 
the  competitions  and  the  wars  which  are  certain 
to  ensue.  Anything  else  is  what  a  French 
royalist  paper  has  called  "  vertiginous  ideal- 
ism," or  what  an  insubordinate  American 
military  politician  has  described  as  "verbal 
massage." 

The  Revolution  is  equally  convinced  that  any- 
thing else  is  highfalutin  nonsense.  Lenin  and 
his  followers  in  all  countries  say  quite  frankly 
that  liberalism  is  dying  and  should  be  extermi- 
nated, that  the  "  idealogy  "  of  the  Wilsons  merely 
confuses  and  blurs  the  issue  which  is  about  to  be 
fought  out  between  the  old  order  resting  on  vio- 
lence and  the  new  order  created  by  violence. 
Lenin  has  no  doubts  that  if  ever  the  choice  is 
narrowed  so  that  the  masses  must  choose  be- 
tween him  and  the  reaction,  his  own  victory  is 
assured.  He  is  quite  right.  Men  will  prefer  a 
violent  hope  to  a  terrible  despair. 

The  old  order  which  so  many  of  the  states- 
men at  Paris  are  trying  so  earnestly  to  maintain 
is  utterly  incapable  of  creating  the  security,  the 


xii  Introduction 


well-being  and  that  temper  of  reconciliation 
which  alone  can  avert  a  universal  revolution. 
There  is  one  chance,  and  a  somewhat  slim  one, 
that  the  purposes  which  Wilson  has  voiced  can, 
if  honestly  applied,  open  an  orderly  road  to  re- 
vival and  freedom.  I  call  it  a  slim  chance,  be- 
cause moral  fervor  can  easily  lose  itself  in  a 
world  where  needs  are  stark  and  scruples  few. 
Many  who  have  supported  Mr.  Wilson  and  still 
support  him  in  all  loyalty,  know  that  his  ideas 
have  never  had  the  precision  and  downrightness 
which  characterizes  both  the  Reaction  and  the 
Revolution.  Those  who  have  said  "  We  demand 
this  territory "  have  known  just  exactly  what 
they  wanted,  as  have  those  who  say  "  We  de- 
mand the  complete  overthrow  of  existing  gov- 
ernments." But  the  Wilson  movement  is  an  ef- 
fort to  temper  the  policies  of  existing  govern- 
ments in  order  to  justify  their  existence.  That 
is  an  immensely  difficult  thing  to  do,  requiring 
the  most  persistent  education,  and  the  shrewdest 
use  of  opportunities.  One  thinks  then  of  the 
Committee  on  Public  Information  and  the  Am- 
erican diplomatic  service  abroad,  and  of  the  in- 
numerable occasions  when  responsible  American 


Introduction  xiii 


officials  in  Europe  derived  their  notions  of  Am- 
erican official  policy  by  reading  the  morning 
newspapers.  I  think  especially  of  the  discom- 
forting remark  made  to  me  by  the  diplomatic 
agent  of  one  of  the  smaller  nations  shortly  be- 
fore the  President  arrived  in  Paris :  "If  he 
knows  exactly  what  he  wants,  he  can  get  it. 
Does  he  know?  He  has  an  ideal;  but  has  he  a 
program  ?  " 

This  much  is  certain.  From  the  day  of  Am- 
erica's entrance  into  the  war  to  the  day  of  the 
armistice,  the  chance  to  lead  Europe  to  a  liberal 
reconstruction  was  completely  in  the  hands  of 
the  President.  With  the  end  of  the  war,  as  my 
Italian  friend  remarked,  this  chance  diminished, 
and  the  winter  in  Paris  has  been  spent  wran- 
gling over  points  that  could  have  been  settled 
with  marvelous  ease  at  any  time  during  the 
course  of  the  war.  But  only  those  who  feed  on 
prejudice,  and  those  who  wish  to  see  failure  at 
Paris,  can  do  anything  now  but  pray  anxiously 
that  they  will  still  be  settled,  and  that  the  peace 
which  emerges  from  the  secrecy  of  Paris  will 
represent  the  faith  that  has  been  proclaimed  to 
all  the  world. 


xiv  Introduction 


For  permission  to  reprint  the  text  which  fol- 
lows I  am  indebted  to  the  New  Republic,  where 
it  first  appeared.  An  address  delivered  before 
the  American  Academy  of  Political  Science  in 
April,  19 1 7,  is  included  in  the  Appendix. 

W.  L. 


New  York  City, 
March  23,  1919. 


THE   POLITICAL   SCENE 


THE  TASK  AT  PARIS 

IT  looks  as  if  a  large  number  of  Americans 
were  thoroughly  frightened  at  what  a  world 
war  can  do  to  the  world.  Curiously  enough 
this  state  of  fear  seems  to  exist  among  those  who 
not  only  were  heart  and  soul  for  the  war  them- 
selves, but  were  convinced  that  they  were  a  little 
more  heart  and  soul  for  it  than  anyone  else. 
They  expected  better  of  this  war,  and  they  are 
really  rather  disappointed  at  the  way  things  are 
working  themselves  out.  They  had  anticipated, 
that  once  the  Hun  was  licked,  the  world  would 
automatically  return,  if  not  to  righteousness,  at 
least  to  something  rather  like  what  it  enjoyed  in 
the  days  when  the  Kaiser  was  still  flattering  mil- 
lionaires and  professors.  Instead  they  discover 
Mr.  Wilson  engaged  in  making  a  peace  that  to 
them  passeth  all  understanding;  instead  of  the 
comfort  of  having  won  and  letting  the  other  fel- 
low worry,  it  seems  to  be  the  victors  who  have  to 

3 


The  Political  Scene 


perform  the  extremely  complicated  and  unmis- 
takably dangerous  task  of  setting  the  earth  to 
rights.  The  old  idea  that  to  the  victor  belong 
the  spoils,  has  turned  into  the  victor's  duty  of 
listening  to  everybody's  troubles.  Not  only 
that.  His  duties  do  not  end  with  listening,  but 
do  actually  involve  a  mass  of  responsibility  for 
the  future  of  which  it  is  fair  to  say  most  Amer- 
icans had  no  notion  when  they  entered  the  war. 
They  did  not  suppose  that  so  many  things  would 
be  irrevocably  changed.  "  War  measures  " — 
the  vast  interruptions  necessary  to  the  fight,  they 
endured  without  murmuring,  but  now  they 
would  like  to  resume. 

It  becomes  clearer  every  day  that  the  war 
was  not  an  interruption  which  will  end  with  the 
end  of  the  war.  For  the  plain  fact  is  that  in- 
ternational relations  as  they  existed  in  19 14  were 
almost  completely  determined  by  the  military 
imperialisms  of  which  Prussia  was  the  chief. 
And  until  we  master  the  fact  that  the  empires 
of  Hohenzollern,  Hapsburg,  Sultan  and  Czar 
were  the  foundations  of  law  and  order  in  Europe 
before  19 14,  we  shall  not  understand  either  the 
meaning   of   their   destruction,    or   the   conse- 


The  Task  at  Paris 


quences  of  our  own  victories.  They  were  the 
basis  of  "  peace,"  such  as  it  was,  and  of  normal 
conditions,  as  men  suffered  them.  Only  Amer- 
ica seemed  to  lie  outside  the  orbit  of  their  in- 
fluence, and  this  proved  in  the  end  to  be  a  de- 
lusion. The  ambitions,  intrigues,  necessities, 
and  tyrannies  of  those  empires  were  the  point  of 
reference  for  all  the  world.  They  set  the  pace 
in  armaments.  Those  towering  systems  of 
power  necessitated  the  building  of  another  sys- 
tem of  power  to  balance  them.  The  character  of 
the  competition  they  created  in  the  backward  por- 
tions of  the  globe  stimulated  an  imitative  com- 
petition. It  did  not  matter  who  liked  their  game 
or  hated  it.  They  made  the  game,  and  reluc- 
tantly or  otherwise  the  game  was  played. 

From  Prussian  Germany  came  the  example  of 
how  to  modernize  and  make  a  success  of  ideas  at 
which  this  generation  was  inclined  to  jeer.  She 
was  not  the  first  of  the  imperial  depotisms,  nor 
altogether  unique  either  in  manners  or  morals. 
Where  her  peculiar  danger  lay  was  that  in  all 
the  others  there  had  arisen  controlling  popular 
forces,  or,  as  in  Russia,  the  administration  of 
tyranny  was  collapsing  through  sheer  incompe- 


The  Political  Scene 


tence.  But  Prussia  was  competent,  and  because 
of  that  competence  she  threatened  to  erect  a 
dazzling  modern  triumph  out  of  ideas  which 
lingered  only  fitfully  in  the  dusty  corners  of  stale 
chancelleries.  She  came  uncomfortably  close 
not  only  to  making  her  will  the  law  of  three  con- 
tinents, but  to  making  her  ideas  the  pattern  of 
conventional  human  thought.  She  almost  dem- 
onstrated how  tyranny  could  be  made  success- 
ful and  on  a  world-wide  scale. 

Her  downfall  brought  down  with  it  the  hopes 
of  those  feebler  empires  which  existed  as  com- 
petitors or  vassals  or  imitators,  and  made  a 
mockery  of  those  empires  which  existed  in  the 
dreams  and  propaganda  of  hopeful  jingoes. 
"  Europe,"  as  it  presented  itself  to  the  old-school 
diplomat,  is  gone.  The  continent  is  still  there, 
most  of  the  population  is  still  there,  to  be  sure, 
but  Europe  as  a  diplomatic  system  is  hopelessly 
gone.  Its  organization  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Pacific,  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Moslem  world 
is  broken,  and  all  the  subsidiary  organizations 
which  leaned  upon  it,  and  against  it,  are  sus- 
pended on  nothing.  Only  small  groups  of  far- 
seeing  men  have  comprehended  even  partially 


The  Task  at  Paris 


that  this  is  what  the  '*  victoire  integrale  "  would 
mean;  that  victory  would  compel  us  to  make  a 
new  framework  for  human  society.  It  is  no 
wonder,  then,  that  many  elder  statesmen,  edu- 
cated in  that  ruined  order,  should  still  act  for  the 
ideas  which  belonged  to  it,  that  Baron  Sonnino 
should  behave  like  a  diplomat  of  the  Triplice,  or 
M.  Pasic  should  be  puzzled  by  the  younger 
Serbs,  that  M.  Pichon  should  have  forgotten 
nothing  but  a  little  of  what  democratic  France 
has  professed. 

The  meaning  of  complete  victory  was  cer- 
tainly not  known  to  those  statesmen  who  wrote 
the  secret  treaties  and  memoranda  which  passed 
between  the  Allies  in  191 5  and  1916.  To  be 
sure,  the  execution  of  what  they  claimed  would 
have  required  clear  victory  over  the  Central 
Powers.  But  although  the  victory  was  to  be  de- 
cisive, it  was  somehow  to  change  nothing  very 
radically.  These  documents  belonged  in  spirit 
to  a  world  in  which  Prussia  was  temporarily  de- 
feated, but  in  which  Prussianism  survived  as  the 
pacemaker  of  Europe.  Moreover,  they  presup- 
posed an  easy  victory — a  victory  which  did  not 
wrack  every  nation  to  its  depths,  and  call  forth 


8  The  Political  Scene 

the  suppressed  energies  of  revolution.  They 
were  written  under  the  double  illusion  that  the 
Europe  of  Sazanov,  Sonnino,  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
and  the  Morning  Post  was  strong  enough  to  de- 
feat the  German  Empire — and  that  having 
defeated  her,  Europe  cotdd  carry  on  as  before. 
Events  proved  that  Prussia  could  not  be  re- 
placed by  paler  reflections  of  herself.  For  in  de- 
stroying her,  it  was  necessary  to  awaken  dor- 
mant peoples  and  submerged  classes  and  the 
western  hemisphere. 

Why  anyone  should  suppose  that  it  was  pos- 
sible to  tear  down  the  authority  which  ruled  in 
central  and  eastern  Europe  without  producing 
disorder,  it  is  difficult  to  understand.  We  have 
torn  down  authority.  We  have  willed  to  tear  it 
down.  It  was  a  vile  authority,  but  it  was  the 
existing  authority  in  law  and  in  fact.  We  sent 
two  million  men  to  France  with  orders  to  tear 
it  down,  to  crush  it  beyond  hope  of  resurrection. 
And  when  you  tear  down,  you  have  torn  down. 
We  started  to  destroy  a  supremely  evil  thing 
and  it  is  destroyed.  The  result  of  destroying  it 
is  destruction,  and  what  is  left  are  fragments, 
and  possibilities,  the  stirrings  of  new  life  long 


The  Task  at  Paris 


suppressed,  old  hopes  released,  old  wrongs  being 
avenged,  and  endless  agitation.  It  is  chaos  by 
every  standard  of  our  thinking,  wild  and  danger- 
ous, perhaps  infectious,  and  thoroughly  uncom- 
fortable. But  we  cannot,  having  deliberately 
torn  a  central  part  of  the  world  order  to  pieces, 
leave  the  wreckage  in  a  panic  and  whimper  that 
it  is  dreadful.  Nor  can  we  cure  it,  or  save  our- 
selves, by  calling  everybody  who  examines  it 
dispassionately  some  idiotic  name  like  pro-Ger- 
man and  Bolshevik. 

It  calls  for  imagination  to  picture  just  what 
has  happened  to  Europe  and  the  world  by  the 
disappearance  of  its  imperial  organizations.  We 
find  ourselves  in  a  world  where  four  of  the 
eight  or  nine  centers  of  decisive  authority  have 
collapsed;  where  hundreds  of  millions  of  people 
have  been  wrenched  from  their  ancient  altars  of 
obedience;  where  the  necessities  of  bare  exist- 
ence are  scarce,  and  precariously  obtained.  These 
people  have  lost  homes,  children,  fathers.  They 
are  full  of  rumor  and  fear,  and  subject  to  every 
gust  of  agitation.  Their  leaders  are  untried, 
their  lands  undefined,  their  class  interests  and 
property  in  a  jumble,  they  cannot  see  ahead  three 


10  The  Political  Scene 

weeks  with  assurance.  It  was  inevitable  that  it 
should  be  so,  once  the  decision  was  taken  to 
destroy  autocracy  to  its  foundations.  For  Prus- 
sian Germany  was  the  last  strong  source  of 
authority  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  the  only  bul- 
wark of  absolutism  to  which  the  old  order  could 
turn  for  help. 


II 

PEACE  AS  OF  JANUARY,  1918 

IN  the  winter  of  1917-18  there  were  men  in 
all  countries  who  saw  this,  and  urged  a  com- 
promise with  the  Prussian  state. 

It  is  no  secret  now  that  a  combination  of 
conservatism  and  war-weariness  nearly  brought 
the  conflict  to  an  indecisive  end  some  time  be- 
tween June,  19 1 7,  and  March,  19 18.  The  sum- 
mer months  had  been  a  time  of  deep  depression 
in  France  after  the  military  failure  of  the  spring. 
In  July  the  German  Reichstag  passed  its  famous 
"  Majority  Resolution " ;  in  early  August  the 
Pope  made  his  appeal;  everywhere  Stockholm 
was  debated.  Kerensky's  failure  was  already 
apparent,  and  although  Pershing  was  in  France, 
he  was  a  general  without  an  army.  Caporetto 
was  followed  swiftly  by  Byng's  failure  at  Cam- 
brai  and  by  the  Bolshevist  revolution.  There 
was  no  longer  an  eastern  front.  The  Italian 
front  seemed  to  be  a  liability;  Saloniki  was  re- 

II 


12  The  Political  Scene 

garded  cynically  as  a  great  Allied  internment 
camp.  Within  the  Central  Powers  there  were 
undoubted  signs  of  popular  revolt,  which  called 
forth  a  certain  feeble  response  from  the  Em- 
peror Charles  and  Count  Czernin. 

By  Christmas  the  yearning  for  peace  had  risen 
high  in  all  countries,  and  the  opening  of  the 
parleys  at  Brest-Litovsk  stirred  men  deeply. 
Beneath  the  surface  the  efforts  at  peace  were 
continual :  General  Smuts  had  gone  to  meet  Count 
Mensdorff  in  Switzerland;  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
and  Lord  Milner  were  inclined  to  abandon 
Russia,  and  Lord  Lansdowne  had  definitely 
announced  that  if  "  civilization " — i.e.  the  old 
European  order,  was  to  be  maintained,  an  imme- 
diate peace  was  necessary.  All  the  while  Luden- 
dorff  was  moving  divisions  to  the  western  front. 
The  ten  weeks  from  December  first  to  mid- 
February  were  the  time  of  supreme  decision. 
They  saw  the  final  attempt  to  save  the  old  system 
and  avert  European  revolution. 

Three  figures  dominated :  Ludendorff ,  Clemen- 
ceau  and  Wilson.  The  choice  lay  between  a  peace 
which  yielded  to  Germany  the  organization  of 
the  East  and  a  frightful  military  gamble  on  the 


Peace  as  of  January,  IQI8         (13 

western  front,  the  issue  of  which  no  man  could 
foresee.  Qemenceau  forced  the  issue,  and  be- 
cause he  succeeded  he  will  belong  to  the  assembly 
of  great  men.  Wilson's  position  was  more  com- 
plicated. He  never  for  an  instant  yielded  to  the 
suggestion  of  an  unclean  peace  at  the  expense  of 
Russia,  but  he  had  been  affected  by  the  reports 
of  feeling  in  England,  by  the  spectacle  of  the 
early  days  at  Brest-Litovsk,  he  had  by  December 
acquired  interest  in  the  Reichstag  Resolution  of 
July;  and  he  had  a  certain  lingering  hope  in 
Czernin.  He  did  not  intend  to  yield  to  Prussia, 
but  he  did  undoubtedly  see  that  unless  the  AlHed 
cause  were  morally  unified  by  diplomacy,  the 
combined  peace  and  military  offensives  from  Ber- 
lin and  Vienna  might  disintegrate  the  Allied 
peoples.  More  than  that,  he  too  was  willing  to 
gamble.  Ludendorff  and  Clemenceau  were  set 
for  a  death  struggle  in  which  all  might  be  lost.  He 
determined  to  try  the  diplomatic  adventure  of 
offering  a  separate  peace  to  Austria. 

It  was  for  this  setting  that  the  Congressional 
Addresses  of  December  fourth  and  January 
eighth  were  prepared.  The  invitation  to  Czernin 
was  plain: 


14  The  Political  Scene 

"  We  owe  it,  however,  to  ourselves  to  say  that 
we  do  not  wish  in  any  way  to  impair  or  to  rear- 
range the  AtistrO'Hungarian  Empire.  It  is  no 
affair  of  ours  what  they  do  with  their  own  life, 
either  industrially  or  politically/' 

Early  in  January  Mr.  Lloyd  George  spoke  in 
the  same  vein,  thus  abandoning  for  the  moment 
the  clear  purpose  of  the  Allied  reply  to  the  Presi- 
dent a  year  previous.  Mr.  Wilson  followed  with 
the  address  of  January  eighth  in  which  he  offered 
to  negotiate  with  representatives  of  the  Reichstag 
majority  on  the  basis  of  the  Fourteen  Points.  It 
was  as  events  showed  a  summons  to  the  dead,  for 
the  majority  had  disappeared  by  that  time,  and 
the  abortive  strikes  of  early  January  had  made 
Ludendorff  military  dictator  of  Germany. 

It  is  a  very  significant  fact  that  the  project  of 
a  League  of  Nations  is  merely  the  Fourteenth  of 
the  articles,  and  is  treated  as  a  kind  of  seal  upon 
the  peace  when  made.  Clearly  Mr.  Wilson  had 
not  yet  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  League 
is  a  means  of  making  peace  as  well  as  a  guaran- 
tee when  peace  has  been  made.  The  reason  is 
that  the  Fourteen  Points  were  conceived  as  a 
just  settlement  in  a  world  not  radically  different 


Peace  as  of  January,  IQ18  15 

in  structure  from  that  out  of  which  the  war  had 
arisen.  This  was  the  only  kind  of  peace  possible 
in  January,  19 18.  At  bottom  it  would  have  been 
an  Agreement  of  the  Powers,  and  nothing  more. 
But  the  peace  which  has  actually  to  be  initiated  in 
Paris  to-day  is  the  result  of  the  19 18  campaign. 
The  Fourteen  Points  were  written  before  that 
campaign  was  fought,  and  that  campaign  in  its 
military,  diplomatic,  and  social  phases  was  the 
most  penetrating  conflict  in  modern  history.  Its 
conclusion  was  radical,  and  out  of  it  nothing  less 
could  result  than  the  necessity  of  creating  a 
new  framework  for  international  society.  The 
decision  to  fight  that  campaign  meant  that  the 
world  had  burned  its  bridges. 

They  were  not  burned  in  the  Fourteen  Points. 
The  sharpest  proof  of  this  is  to  be  found  in 
Article  II,  which  reads: 

*'  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the 
seas,  outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and 
in  war,  except  as  the  seas  may  he  closed  in  whole 
or  in  part  by  international  action  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  international  covenants." 

This  article  opens  with  an  attempt  to  safe- 
guard the  rights  of  neutrals.    That  much  of  it 


1 6  The  Political  Scene 

supposes  a  world  not  controlled  by  a  League  of 
Nations.  But  the  portion  beginning  "  except  as 
the  seas  may  be  closed  '*  foreshadows  Article  XVI 
of  the  constitution  drafted  at  Paris  where  the 
boycott  is  provided  as  a  sanction.  As  the  propo- 
sition stood  on  January  eighth  it  seems  to  imply 
united  and  occasional  action  by  the  League. 
Above  all  it  recognized  war  as  a  normal  institu- 
tion. In  the  document  from  Paris  the  League's 
action  is  virtually  complete. 

I  venture  this  criticism  simply  because  it  illus- 
trates a  truth  of  special  importance  to  us  at  this 
moment:  that  the  war  became  revolutionary  (in 
the  exact  sense  of  the  word)  only  as  a  result  of 
the  19 1 8  campaign;  that  previously  statesmen 
saw  the  League  of  Nations  as  a  useful  annex  to 
the  structure  of  peace;  that  after  19 18  it  became 
the  central  framework  of  the  structure. 

Early  last  winter  the  best  that  leading  states- 
men planned  was  a  balance  of  claims,  an  adjust- 
ment of  a  few  outstanding  grievances,  and  the 
acceptance  of  a-  number  of  general  principles 
resting  upon  nothing  more  than  common  agree- 
ment. That  is  why  the  territorial  sections  of 
Mr.  Wilson's  program  are  in  so  far  as  they  affect 


Peace  as  of  January,  igi8  17 

the  Great  Powers  chiefly  self-denying  ordinances. 
The  reference  to  Alsace-Lorraine  is  carefully 
phrased  so  as  to  exclude  the  annexation  of  the 
Saar  basin,  for  it  is  the  wrong  of  187 1  and  not 
the  wrong  of  181 5  which  is  to  be  righted.  Italy's 
portion  conspicuously  ignores  strategic  consider- 
ations; the  Russian  section  avoids  mention  of  the 
border  nations,  and  except  for  the  establishment 
of  Poland,  assumes  a  reconstitution  of  the  former 
boundaries  of  the  Empire.  Serbia  is  promised 
the  outlet  so  long  denied  her,  but  Jugo-Slavia  is 
not  mentioned  because  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire's  integrity  is  presupposed.  Rumania 
retains  her  old  boundaries  vis-a-vis  Hungary. 
The  Czecho-Slovaks  do  not  appear  at  all.  The 
dismemberment  of  Turkey  is  not  specified,  and 
the  only  new  state  definitely  demanded  is  Poland. 
Here  the  phrase  "indisputably  Polish  popula- 
tions "  expressly  precludes  those  geographical 
fantasies  which  reach  into  Lithuanian  and 
Ukrainian  territory. 

Finally  the  Fourteen  Points  do  not  deal  with 
the  mechanism  of  economic  life  which  the  short- 
age of  ships,  food  and  materials  compelled  the 
Allies  to  organize  in  1918.     That  mechanism 


1 8  The  Political  Scene 

barely  existed  when  the  Points  were  formulated. 
Its  bearing  upon  the  whole  peace  was  not  under- 
stood then  except  by  a  few  far-sighted  men  like 
Mr.  Dwight  Morrow  and  Mr.  George  Rublee. 
Its  bearing  is  not  adequately  realized  today,  as 
the  constitution  of  the  League  indicates.  Mr. 
Wilson's  ideal,  then  as  now,  both  in  international 
and  in  domestic  affairs  was  that  New  Freedom 
which  is  the  Old  Manchester.  But  even  the  fight-* 
ing  edge  of  that  ideal — "  the  removal,  so  far  as 
possible,  of  all  economic  barriers"  has  been 
blunted  by  the  discovery  that  not  much  removal 
is  possible. 

The  practice  of  international  cooperation  in 
trade  advanced  extraordinarily  in  19 18.  But  the 
political  appreciation  of  it  lags  behind,  and  we 
approach  the  modern  period  with  a  new  politics 
and  an  unrevised  industrialism.  Not  all  of  our 
thinking  is  as  swift  as  events. 


Ill 

ABSOLUTE  VICTORY 

REFORM,  not  reconstruction,  was  the  in- 
tention a  little  over  a  y^r  ago.  But 
Germany  under  Ludendorff  had  no  such 
tame  ambition.  Facing  towards  the  East  she 
assessed  the  materials  of  empire  from  Finland 
to  Turkestan.  Instead  of  the  comparatively 
modest  project  of  Hamburg  to  Bagdad  she 
toyed  with  a  bewildering  choice  of  routes  and 
markets  and  materials  and  jobs  across  the 
Ukraine  to  the  Caucasus.  Such  a  jig-saw  puzzle 
of  thrones  and  concessions  never  delighted  the 
mind  of  the  craziest  diplomat.  The  only  diffi- 
culty was  that  the  Allies  on  the  west  had  hold  of 
Germany's  coat  tails.  To  shake  them  off  Luden- 
dorff determined  to  strike  in  Picardy  for  the 
Empire  of  the  East. 

His  margin  of  reserves  and  materials  was  too 
small;  a  superiority  of  a  little  over  300,000 
bayonets  was  not  enough  to  complete  the  break 

19 


20  The  Political  Scene 

through.  But  it  was  enough  to  frighten  the 
Allies  into  unity,  and  bring  America  enormously 
to  France.  By  June  fifteenth,  in  spite  of  the  de- 
feat in  Champagne,  Foch  commanded  more  fight- 
ing men  than  Ludendorff,  and  the  superiority  was 
steadily  growing.  The  German  government 
undoubtedly  knew  the  figures,  and  a  little  over 
a  week  later  Kiihlmann  made  his  extraordinary 
speech  renouncing  military  victory  while  the 
German  army  was  bombarding  Paris.  The 
aggressive  faction  in  Allied  circles  had  guessed 
a  German  weakness  from  the  diminished  inten- 
sity of  the  June  battles  west  of  Soissons,  and  so 
a  counter-offensive  was  planned.  It  was  even 
believed  at  the  end  of  June,  and  so  prophesied, 
that  the  German  collapse  might  occur  by  the  end 
of  September.  Three  objectives  were  laid  down 
— the  reduction  of  the  salients  at  Montdidier, 
the  Marne,  and  St.  Mihiel.  Then  through  ex- 
cellent intelligence  work  on  the  part  of  the 
French,  the  German  attack  of  mid-July  was 
completely  foreseen,  and  brilliantly  smashed  by 
General  Gouraud's  army.  The  Allied  offen- 
sive opened  immediately,  with  extraordinary 
results. 


Absolute  Victory  21 

Concurrently,  the  diplomacy  of  the  Allies  was 
being  rearranged  on  the  axiom  of  a  complete 
victory.  The  references  to  Austria-Hungary 
made  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  the  President 
during  the  winter  had  depressed  the  groups 
working  for  the  "  victoire  integrale."  These 
groups  had  always  been  as  radically  anti-Haps- 
burg  as  they  were  anti-Hohenzollern.  Their 
organ  was  The  New  Europe,  and  they  made  it 
the  one  most  indispensable  periodical  in  the 
English-speaking  world.  Its  contributors  were 
gathered  from  all  parts  of  Europe,  and  many  of 
them  were  themselves  leaders  in  the  work  by 
which  Allied  and  American  diplomacy  was  turned 
during  1918  from  the  policy  of  compromise  with 
Austria  to  that  of  dismemberment.  Masaryk, 
Benes,  Trumbic,  Steed,  Seton-Watson  and  others 
led  the  way  with  a  skill,  an  expert  knowledge, 
and  a  vision  which  made  the  rest  of  us  their 
pupils  and  their  debtors. 

Their  task  was  to  form  a  working  partnership 
between  the  nationalist  forces  of  Central  Europe 
and  the  Allied  cause,  to  disrupt  middle  Europe 
from  within  while  the  German  army  was  held 
and   finally   beaten   in   France.     They   realized 


22  The  Political  Scene 

before  most  of  us  that  the  apparent  strength  of 
Prussian  Germany  had  the  fatal  weakness  of 
reposing  upon  the  subjugation  of  smaller  peoples 
through  the  alliance  with  German  Austria  and 
the  Magyar  oligarchy.  They  knew  that  the 
destruction  of  absolutism  meant  the  break  up  of 
that  military  and  bureaucratic  alliance  through 
/  which  these  nations  were  held  down.  And  they 
knew  equally  well  that  once  this  power  was 
wrecked  it  would  be  necessary  to  rebuild  the 
whole  diplomatic  structure  of  Europe. 

In  191 8  they  set  about  wrecking  it.  Once  the 
decision  was  taken  to  fight  the  war  to  a  conclu- 
sion many  men  came  to  their  assistance  who 
were  not  primarily  interested  in  the  freeing  of 
the  nations.  Thus  they  were  able  gradually  to 
convince  the  statesmen  of  the  West  that  the 
encouragement  of  rebellion  would  be  an  impor- 
tant military  factor  in  the  final  result.  But 
before  an  alliance  with  these  nations  could  actu- 
ally be  realized  a  formidable  series  of  diplomatic 
obstacles  had  to  be  overcome.  The  full  story  of 
the  mancEuvers  by  which  this  w^as  partially 
achieved  in  191 8  is  an  intricate  tale,  and  all  the 
facts  are  as  yet  unrevealed. 


Absolute  Victory  23 

But  the  main  outlines  are  known  and  can  be 
told :  Two  nationalities  had  strategic  importance 
— the  Czecho-Slovaks  and  the  Jugo-Slavs,  both 
because  of  their  geographical  position,  their  in- 
ternal strength,  and  the  definiteness  of  their 
aspirations.  The  Czecho-Slovaks  were  known  to 
be  one  of  the  best  educated  and  most  trustworthy 
peoples  in  the  world — ^politically  as  mature  as  any 
nation  on  the  continent.  They  had,  moreover,  a 
most  important  advantage  over  the  Jugo-Slavs; 
their  territory  did  not  touch  Allied  territory  at 
any  point,  and  there  was  no  Allied  group  of  any 
significance  interested  in  thwarting  them.  The 
case  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  was  complicated  by  their 
territorial  conflict  with  Italy,  and  by  the  internal 
difficulty  arising  out  of  dynastic  jealousies  at  the 
court  of  the  Serbian  kingdom. 

The  problem  soon  narrowed  itself  to  the  status 
of  the  Jugo-Slavs.  If  that  could  be  adjusted  the 
Allies  would  have  as  allies  the  two  nations  of 
Central  Europe  through  whose  lands  ran  the 
chief  arteries  of  the  German-Austrian  system. 
But  the  Jugo-Slav  question  turned  on  the  validity 
of  the  Treaty  of  London  which  was  the  price  of 
Italy's  participation  in  the  war.     Would  Italy 


24  The  Political  Scene 

renounce  those  portions  of  the  treaty  which 
assigned  to  her  lands  inhabited  by  Jugo-Slavs? 
If  she  would,  Austria  would  soon  be  out  of  the 
war.  If  she  refused  untold  complications  faced 
the  Allies.  For  ethnic  justice  to  the  Southern 
Slavs  became  the  touchstone  of  Allied  sincerity, 
and  every  small  nation  watched  the  diplomatic 
debate  anxiously  for  evidence  as  to  whether  any 
one  of  the  major  allies  would  yield  annexationist 
claims  for  the  sake  of  the  principles  they  all 
professed. 

England  and  France  could  not  officially  press 
Italy  to  accept  a  revision  of  the  treaty  because 
they  had  signed  the  treaty.  America  was  hesi- 
tant and  at  first  not  particularly  well  informed, 
while  the  more  important  figures  in  the  embassy 
at  Rome  were,  as  so  often  happens  to  American 
embassies  abroad,  very  much  under  the  influence 
of  fashionable  chauvinism  at  the  capital.  The 
policy  adopted  by  the  reformers  was  shrewd,  and 
inspired  by  a  genuine  devotion  to  the  larger 
interests  and  honor  of  Italy.  They  set  about 
inducing  Italy  herself  to  take  the  leadership  in 
cementing  the  alliance  between  the  Austrian 
nationalities  and  the  Entente.    The  first  step  was 


Absolute  Victory  25 

the  pact  concluded  on  March  seventh,  191 8,  be- 
tween Dr.  Torre,  representing  a  committee  of  the 
Italian  Parliament,  and  the  Jugo-Slav  leader.  Dr. 
Trumbic.  Italian  liberals  within  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  and  in  the  press  well  understood  the 
peril  to  Italy  and  to  Europe  of  Baron  Sonnino's 
insistence  upon  his  pound  of  flesh.  They  coop- 
erated loyally,  and  in  early  April  the  Congress 
of  the  Oppressed  Nationalises  of  Austria- 
Hungary  was  held  in  Rome.  The  resolution  of 
that  Congress  demanded  the  dismemberment  of 
Austria-Hungary  by  the  constructive  liberation 
of  the  oppressed  Austro-Hungarian  nationalities. 
The  Italian  Premier  blessed  the  deliberations. 
The  result  was  highly  important  in  Central 
Europe;  it  made  Vienna  furious  and  fearful. 
Italy's  action,  however,  was  not  altogether 
official,  for  the  Treaty  of  London  had  not  been 
renounced.  At  the  end  of  May  the  United  States 
recognized  the  aspirations  of  the  subject  peoples, 
but  the  language  employed  was  vague,  and  at  the 
Versailles  council  of  early  June  Baron  Sonnino 
refused  to  assent  to  the  complete  recognition  of 
the  Jugo-Slavs,  taking  refuge  behind  Mr.  Lan- 
sing's obscurity.     Nevertheless,  the  result  had 


26  The  Political  Scene 

been  sufficient  to  cause  the  disaffection  of  Slav 
troops,  and  the  offensive  on  the  Piave  in  June  v^as 
materially  weakened  by  the  propaganda  of  the 
Allies.  At  the  end  of  June  Mr.  Lansing  cleared 
up  the  obscurity,  and  definitely  stated  that  the 
liberation  of  these  peoples  was  an  American  war 
aim. 

In  August,  under  the  influence  primarily  of 
Lord  Northcliffe  and  Mr.  Wickham  Steed, 
another  attempt  was  made  to  induce  Baron  Son- 
nino  to  recognize  the  claims  of  the  Jugo-Slavs. 
This  precipitated  a  violent  political  controversy  in 
Italy.  At  the  same  time  Great  Britain  and  the 
f-  United  States  formally  recognized  the  Czecho- 
\  Slovaks  as  belligerent  allies.  This  action  caused 
dismay  in  Vienna,  and  was  the  cause  of  the  post- 
ponement of  peace  proposals,  which  finally  came 
from  Austria  a  month  later.  For  Austria  had 
determined  early  in  August  to  ask  for  peace,  and 
had  secured  the  consent  of  Germany  following 
the  success  of  the  Allied  counter-offensive.  The 
note  was  already  drafted  when  Britain  and 
America  recognized  the  government  of  Masaryk, 
and  by  implication  declared  for  the  dismember- 
ment of  the  Dual  Empire.    The  argument  of  the 


Absolute  Victory  27 

Austrian  note  was  based  upon  the  speeches  of 
January  in  which  the  integrity  of  the  Empire 
was  promised.  The  recognition  of  the  Czecho- 
slovaks made  it  meaningless,  and  so  the  delivery 
of  the  note  was  delayed  until  mid-September, 
when  it  was  laun9hed  virtually  unamended  in  a 
gesture  of  despair.  At  about  the  same  time  Italy 
issued  an  official  communique  recognizing  Jugo- 
slav aspirations,  and  the  Allied  world  waited  for 
an  Italian  offensive  against  the  disintegrating 
Austrian  troops. 

During  the  summer,  the  diplomatic  campaign 
had  been  extended  to  Bulgaria.  It  is  not  gen- 
erally known  just  what  was  the  character  of  the 
secret  manoeuvers  which  led  up  to  the  success  of 
Franchet  d'Esperey's  attack  in  Macedonia,  though 
the  disaffection  of  Bulgaria  had  been  prophesied 
ever  since  the  fall  of  Radoslavov  and  the  visits 
of  Ferdinand  to  Germany.  Some  spoke  know- 
ingly of  the  cavalry  of  St.  George.  At  any  rate 
with  the  fall  of  Bulgaria  the  resurrection  of 
Rumania  became  possible,  and  Hungary  was  in 
peril.  Then  the  Ukraine  revolted  against  the 
foraging  detachments,  and  at  that  moment  Mr. 
Wilson  made  the  sensational  speech  of  Septem- 


28  The  Political  Scene 

ber  twenty-seventh,  which  was  read  in  Germany 
during  the  first  days  of  October. 

This  speech  with  its  extraordinary  moderation 
coincided  with  the  first  successes  of  the  American 
army  between  the  Argonne  Forest  and  the  river 
Meuse.  That  gigantic  battle  had  as  its  purpose 
the  defeat  of  Ludendorff's  plan  to  retreat  to  the 
Meuse,  to  establish  a  new  defensive  line  for  the 
winter  and  negotiate  peace  from  behind  his 
defenses.  When  the  opening  phase  of  the 
American  attack  carried  through  the  first  three 
positions  Ludendorff  demanded  an  armistice,  and 
the  government  of  Prince  Max  was  called  upon 
to  accomplish  it. 


IV 

"THE  NATURAL  MASTER  OF  THE 
HOUSE  " 

MAX  did  what  Austria  had  tried  to  do 
a  few  weeks  earlier.  He  tried  to  secure 
peace  as  of  January  instead  of  October.  And 
though  in  form  the  armistice  was  signed  on 
that  basis,  in  reality,  the  peace  which  is  actually 
being  made,  must,  because  of  the  revolutionary 
events  of  1918,  differ  radically  from  that  which 
was  contemplated  when  the  Fourteen  Points 
were  written.  After  the  military  decision  of  late 
October,  and  in  face  of  the  Lorraine  offensive 
which  had  been  prepared  and  of  the  revolution 
within  the  Empire,  Germany  did  in  fact  surren- 
der as  unconditionally  as  Austria.  The  only 
lasting  significance  of  the  armistice  negotiations 
was  the  voluntary  acceptance  by  the  European 
Allies  of  a  few  negative  obligations  and  certain 
general  principles.  The  successive  renewals  of 
the  armistice  show  that  the  first  terms  were 
dictated  unconditionally. 

29 


-^o  The  Political  Scene 

The  original  armistice  was  prepared  hastily; 
French  views  seem  to  have  prevailed  in  its  mili- 
tary features;  British  in  its  naval;  and  American 
in  its  political.  In  the  Austrian  armistice  it 
appears  that  Italy  was  given  a  free  hand,  with 
the  result  that  the  line  of  occupation  had  a  fatal 
resemblance  with  certain  additions  to  the  line 
of  annexationist  claims.  The  Treaty  of  London 
appeared  at  the  decisive  moment  with  renewed 
vigor. 

November  was  a  period  of  great  anxiety.  The 
victory  had  come  swiftly.  It  had  brought  the 
necessity  of  reconstructing  Europe  externally 
and  internally.  And  almost  everyone  was  dazed, 
tired,  and  suspicious.  The  most  serious  feature 
of  all,  to  speak  frankly,  was  an  Anglo-American 
irritation  in  official  circles,  for  the  peace  of  the 
world  depended  upon  a  working  partnership 
between  the  only  two  Powers  which  had  the 
resources  for  a  creative  statesmanship.  The 
President  arrived  at  the  very  moment  when  com- 
mon counsel  was  least,  and  national  propaganda 
most  evident.  It  was  a  time  when  the  tendency 
was  to  pull  apart,  and  get  out  of  the  war  helter- 
skelter.     The  same  weariness  of  mind  which 


'*  The  Natural  Master  of  the  House ''    31 

accounts  for  the  President's  address  to  Congress 
before  sailing,  the  same  individualism,  was  epi- 
demic in  Europe. 

His  presence  soon  changed  the  atmosphere,  and 
by  January  America  and  Britain  had  ceased 
pinching  each  other,  and  were  at  work.  The 
great  unifier  was  the  determination  to  make  the 
League  of  Nations  the  basis  of  peace.  For  here 
was  a  task  which  reached  beyond  national  vanity 
into  the  future.  It  was  a  task  which  lifted  men's 
minds  once  again  to  the  exalted  aims  which  had 
consoled  them  for  the  war,  and  threw  into  a 
humane  perspective  the  more  immediate  demands 
which  had  become  so  clamorous. 

The  Allied  conference  in  Paris  began  in  Jan- 
uary to  build  peace  in  the  only  way  that  it  could 
be  built.  Faced  with  a  world  in  which  govern- 
ment had  disappeared  over  immense  areas,  in 
which  the  old  diplomatic  system  was  ruined,  the 
statesmen  were  forced  to  start  in  by  creating  the 
tool  with  which  peace  could  be  administered, 
They  knew  that  there  are  no  final  solutions  to  be 
had  just  now.  A  rigid  treaty  of  peace  cannot  be 
written  when  there  is  no  stable  government  any- 
where east  of  the  Rhine.    No  man  knows  what 


^52  The  Political  Scene 

Germany  is  to  be,  nor  Russia,  nor  the  twenty 
odd  nationalities  of  Eastern  Europe  and  Nearer 
Asia.  No  man  can  possibly  foresee,  not  even 
Mr.  James  Beck,  what  adjustments  will  be 
required  in  the  years  ahead;  none  can  predict 
what  revolution  will  do  to  the  process  and  method 
of  trade,  nor  does  anyone  know  what  will  be 
the  movements  of  immigration,  or  the  condition 
of  capital,  or  the  character  and  policies  of  any 
government  five  years  hence.  There  is  a  world- 
wide regrouping  in  progress.  It  cannot  be  con- 
trolled by  agreement  alone.  It  requires  a  con- 
/  tinning  series  of  decisions,  and  a  machinery  for 
5  executing  them,  and  that  is  the  essence  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

It  is  a  constitution  of  common  action  adopted 
by  the  stable  powers  in  a  period  of  unpredictable 
change.  To  suppose  that  the  conference  was 
merely  fumbling  with  a  vague  future  under  the 
pressure  of  idealists  is  a  complete  misunderstand- 
ing. The  truth  has  been  stated  by  the  man  whose 
statesmanship  has  been  one  of  the  happiest 
resources  of  Europe  and  perhaps  the  decisive 
influence  in  the  constitution  drafted  at  Paris. 
This  man  is  Lieutenant-General  J.  C.  Smuts.    In 


''  The  Natural  Master  of  the  House ''     33 

a  pamphlet  published  the  middle  of  December, 
19 1 8,  he  states  the  core  of  the  matter  as  it  con- 
fronts the  Peace  Conference: 

"Europe  is  being  liquidated,  and  the  League 
of  Nations  must  be  the  heir  to  this  great  estate. 
The  peoples  left  behind  by  the  decomposition  of 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Turkey  are  mostly  untrained 
politically;  many  of  them  are  either  incapable  or 
deficient  in  power  of  self -government ;  they  are 
mostly  destitute  and  will  require  much  nursing 
toward  economic  and  political  independence.  If 
there  is  going  to  be  a  scramble  among  the  victors 
for  this  loot,  the  future  of  Europe  must  indeed 
be  despaired  of.  The  application  of  the  spoils 
system  at  this  most  solemn  juncture  of  the  his- 
tory of  the  world;  a  repartition  of  Europe  at  a 
moment  when  Europe  is  bleeding  at  every  pore  as 
a  result  of  partitions  less  than  haif  a  century  old, 
would  indeed  be  incorrigible  madness  on  the  part 
of  rulers,  and  enough  to  drive  the  torn  and 
broken  peoples  of  the  world  to  that  despair  of  the 
state  which  is  the  motive  power  behind  Russian 
Bolshevism,  Surely  the  only  statesmanlike  course 
is  to  make  the  League  of  Nations  the  reversion- 
ary in  the  broadest  sense  of  these  etnpires.    In 


34  The  Political  Scene 

this  debacle  of  the  old  Europe  the  League  of 
Nations  is  no  longer  an  outsider  or  stranger,  but 
the  natural  master  of  the  house.  It  becomes 
naturally  and  obviously  the  solvent  for  a  problem 
which  no  other  means  will  solve'' 


THE  COVENANT 

IT  is  useless  to  discuss  the  covenant  as  if  it 
were  an  abstract  document  snatched  from 
the  blue.  It  is  an  arrangement  devised  by  men 
who  knew  the  condition  of  things,  knew  that 
years  of  trouble  are  ahead,  knew  that  no  final 
settlement  would  be  made  now  by  mortal  man, 
knew  that  Europe  would  revert  to  anarchy  unless 
the  governments  of  the  world  agreed  to  meet 
regularly,  exchange  information,  make  decisions 
together,  and  cooperate  in  the  execution  of  the 
treaty.  They  understood  that  if  each  nation 
went  its  own  way  and  the  secret  jealousies  re- 
vived, if  the  old  suspicions  were  allowed  to  fester 
in  each  foreign  office  and  in  each  general  staff,  if 
heads  of  governments  did  not  bind  themselves  to 
meet  around  a  table  and  speak  face  to  face,  then 
there  was  little  hope  that  the  world  could  rise 
out  of  the  prostration  of  the  war. 

They  provided,  therefore,  first  of  all  for  the 

3S 


; 


36  The  Political  Scene 

presence  in  one  city  of  men  who  can  speak  for 
the  governments.  This  in  itself  is  of  transcend- 
ent importance.  For  modern  diplomacy  cannot 
continue  to  transact  its  business  through  the 
machinery  of  embassies  and  state  departments 
alone.  No  decision  can  be  made  on  time,  no 
discussion  can  take  place  without  involved  mis- 
understanding by  the  old  method  of  scattered 
information  and  criss-cross  correspondence  be- 
tween negotiators.  You  have  only  to  read  the 
dispatches  of  the  Twelve  Days  which  preceded 
the  war  to  realize  the  paralysis  which  results 
from  the  lack  of  any  one  place  where  the  great 
decisions  of  mankind  can  be  centralized.  If 
there  is  one  method  of  insuring  the  irritation  of 
ignorance  and  suspicion  it  is  long  distance  tele- 
graphic communication  between  the  heads  of 
governments.  The  mere  act  of  committing  ideas 
to  paper  for  the  scrutiny  of  biographers  stiffens 
the  mind  and  arouses  the  disastrous  desire  to  pose 
nobly.  There  is  little  good  humor  in  official 
dispatches;  like  most  newspaper  editorials,  they 
are  sick  with  infallibility,  and  there  is  nothing 
worse  for  the  peace  of  the  world  than  two  infal- 
lible diplomats  uttering  strong  sentiment  at  each 


The  Covenant  37 


other  from  opposite  ends  of  a  cable.  Writing 
"  state  papers,"  for  posterity,  instead  of  doing 
business,  is  bad  enough,  but  when  you  add  to  it 
the  sheer  nuisance  of  coding,  decoding,  and  trans- 
lating, with  the  correlative  arts  of  cracking  codes 
and  listening-in,  you  have  produced  a  very  subtle 
engine  of  mischief.  ^_. 

Then,  too,  the  atmosphere  in  which  embassies  i 
exist  invites  intrigue.  In  each  capital  there  is  a 
little  cosmopolitan  village  known  as  the  diplo- 
matic set  where  gossip  is  a  means  of  social 
prestige,  and  whispering  a  delight.  Few  can  resist 
the  lure  of  a  good  "  inside  "  rumor,  with  all  it 
implies  of  secrecy  and  knowing  a  perfectly 
tremendously  awful  lot.  That  is  how  diplomacy 
derives  its  false  glamour.  The  ordinary  business 
between  nations  may  be  difficult,  it  is  nevertheless 
a  concrete  and  practical  business.  But  in  the 
dinners  and  week-end  parties  of  a  capital  that 
business  is  made  into  an  artificial  game  for  the 
titillation  of  a  bored  group  of  privileged  people. 
By  them  it  is  refined  and  subtilized  and  screened 
in  personality,  as  if  the  happiness  of  mankind 
were  not  at  stake.  — * 

AH  this  is  complicated  further  by  the  employ- 


^8  The  Political  Scene 

ment  of  propaganda  to  manipulate  opinion.  Ehir- 
ing  this  war  the  deliberate  manufacture  of 
opinion  both  for  export  and  for  home  consump- 
tion has  reached  the  proportion  of  a  major  indus- 
trial operation.  This  is  not  the  place,  nor  is  it 
yet  possible  without  breach  of  confidence  to  dis- 
cuss international  propaganda  freely.  But  some 
day  the  technic  must  be  investigated  if  the 
judgments  of  peoples  are  to  escape  persistent 
exploitation.  When  the  story  is  told,  it  will  cover 
a  range  of  subjects  extending  from  legal  censor- 
ship to  reptile  press,  from  wilful  fabrication  to 
the  purchase  of  writers,  from  outright  subsidy  to 
the  award  of  ribbons.  It  will  include  entertain- 
ment, and  a  vast  amount  of  stimulated  snobbish- 
ness, and  the  right  way  of  conducting  sight- 
seeing tours.  The  art  of  befuddlement  engages 
able  men  and  draws  large  appropriations.  There 
are  in  practically  all  countries  Ministries  of 
Befuddlement  generally  presided  over  by  per- 
sonal representatives  of  the  leading  statesman. 
What  they  emit  makes  uncon fused  dealing 
between  nations  most  difficult. 

It  is  necessary  consequently  to  break  through 
all  this  and  establish  a  personal  meeting  of  repre- 


The  Covenant  39 

sentatives.  Two  men  doing  business  will  write 
and  write  and  write,  and  listen  to  what  their 
friends  say  at  the  club,  and  what  their  wives 
heard  from  somebody  else's  wife,  and  go  ever 
deeper  into  confusion.  Unless  they  meet  and 
talk  it  out,  they  never  will  catch  up  with  each 
other's  misunderstandings.  So  with  govern- 
ments, and  that  is  why  a  league  of  peace  cannot 
get  along  without  a  board  of  delegates  and  a 
standing  committee  as  its  executive.  There  is  no 
other  basis  even  with  the  best  of  intentions  for 
common  action  and  decent  intercourse.  If  the 
nations  are  to  work  together  responsible  leaders 
must  confront  one  another. 


VI 

A  WORLD  POOL 

AND  if  they  meet,  they  cannot  afford  to 
appear  in  shining  armor  each  morning 
after  breakfast.  For  one  thing  the  cost  is  pro- 
hibitive. To  start  in  where  the  war  had  led 
us,  to  pile  up  heavy  artillery,  tanks,  airplanes,  gas, 
transports,  dreadnoughts,  submarines,  destroyers 
for  a  war  as  great  as  the  possibilities  of  science, 
is  a  proposal  that  no  statesman  in  Europe  dares 
to  contemplate.  That  is  left  for  theorists  like 
Mr.  Henry  A.  Wise  Wood,  and  I  suspect  for 
him  only  in  the  absence  of  the  tax  bills.  There 
cannot  be  another  race  of  armaments — that  is 
flat.  There  is  no  need  to  argue  from  reasons  of 
humanity.  Those  who  dream  of  renewing  the 
competition,  and  contemplate  calmly  another  war 
fought  by  our  children,  are  impervious  to  such 
arguments,  and  no  one  need  waste  ink  and  breath 
trying  to  convince  them.    The  argument  does  not 

40 


A  World  Pool  41 

lie  between  right  and  wrong,  but  between  the 
possible  and  the  impossible.  The  world  cannot 
arm  competitively. 

Nor  can  it  re-establish  a  balance  of  power 
unless  the  supreme  madness  descends  upon  the 
English-speaking  peoples.  I  take  it  that  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  will  contain  provisions  for  the 
disarmament  of  Germany  as  a  world  power.  As 
far  as  we  can  see  into  the  future  Russia  will  be 
militarily  impotent,  and  nobody  in  his  senses,  I 
suppose,  intends  to  arm  Africa,  or  to  permit  any 
aggressive  armament  in  Asia.  There  are  in  fact 
but  two  great  states  with  the  resources  and  the 
wealth  for  really  modern  munitions  manufac- 
ture. These  are  the  British  Empire  and  the 
United  States.  The  only  possible  way  in 
which  a  balance  could  be  created  now  is  by 
putting  these  two  powers  up  as  the  leaders 
of  rival  coalitions.  If  this  idea  is  abandoned 
for  the  nonsense  that  it  is,  if  Britain  and 
America  work  out  their  common  purposes,  then 
such  a  preponderance  of  power  is  created  as  to 
make  all  notion  of  a  balance  impossible.  An 
Anglo-American  entente  means  the  substitution 
of  a  pool  for  a  balance,  and  in  that  pool  will  be 


42  The  Political  Scene 

found  the  ultimate  force  upon  which  rests  the 
League  of  Nations.  For  if  the  united  power  of 
Britain  and  America — potential  and  actual — ^is 
wielded  for  the  ends  they  now  both  officially 
profess,  they  are  assured  of  the  active  assistance 
of  the  smaller  nations  everywhere.  The  reason 
for  this  is  that  they  exercise  a  form  of  force — 
sea  power — which  is  irresistible  in  conflict  and 
yet  cannot  be  used  permanently  to  conscript  and 
enslave  alien  peoples.  Nor  does  it  rest  internally 
upon  the  existence  of  a  large  caste  in  control  of 
a  regimented  population.  Sea  power  can  be  all- 
powerful  without  destroying  the  liberties  of  the 
nation  which  exercises  it,  and  only  free  peoples 
can  be  trusted  with  great  power.  In  spite  of  the 
comparison  between  navalism  and  militarism 
there  are  these  fundamental  differences  between 
them,  and  they  are  appreciated  by  the  bulk  of 
the  world. 

A  question  remains,  which  may  be  put  in  this 
fashion :  What  assurance  is  there  that  this  pool- 
ing of  force  can  be  maintained  in  an  emergency? 
The  answer  is  that  the  covenant  provides  a  pro- 
cedure in  disputes,  the  final  object  of  which  is 
to  insure  delay  accompanied  by  publicity.   It  is  a 


^A  World  Pool  43 

mechanism  for  airing  quarrels  in  their  earlier 
stages.  Here  is  the  ultimate  guarantee  upon 
which  the  whole  project  rests.  It  assumes  as  its 
working  theory  that  democratic  faith  in  regard 
to  the  causes  of  war,  which  says  that  aggression 
is  the  work  of  a  minority;  that  the  masses  in  no 
nation  have  anything  to  gain  by  conquest,  and 
that  the  masses  would  refuse  such  wars  if  they 
had  a  chance  to  examine  their  pretexts,  and  put 
pressure  upon  their  governments.  This  faith 
may  be  unfounded.  It  may  be  that  there  is  a 
universal  pugnacity  which  requires  war  for  its 
satisfaction,  and  the  League  may  in  the  course 
of  time  fail  to  keep  the  peace.  Perhaps,  but  the 
peoples  who  to-day  press  against  every  govern- 
ment, and  may  to-morrow  control  them,  hold 
this  faith,  and  it  has  prevailed  in  the  delibera- 
tions at  Paris. 

The  most  radical  feature  of  the  covenant 
springs  from  this  faith. 

"It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  h& 
the  FRIENDLY  RIGHT  of  eack  of  the  high  con--, 
trading  parties  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  body 
of  delegates  or  the  Executive  council  to  any  cir- 
cumstances    affecting    international    intercourse 


44  The  Political  Scene 

which  threaten  to  disturb  international  peace  or 
the  good  understanding  between  nations  upon 
which  peace  depends/' 

That  clause  is  the  most  precious  in  the  whole 
document  because  it  strikes  so  deeply  at  the  isola- 
tion which  breeds  arrogance.  It  is  by  far  the 
most  revolutionary  idea  which  could  be  intro- 
duced into  the  comity  of  nations,  because  a  seal 
is  put  upon  the  truth  that  the  peace  of  the  world 
is  a  vital  interest  of  all  nations.  The  active 
forces  of  peace  are  released  by  it.  According  to 
this  new  doctrine  it  will  not  be  necessary  for  any 
people,  neutral  in  a  dispute,  to  sit  by  helplessly 
and  see  a  conflagration  prepared  which  may  burn 
down  its  own  homes.  It  abolishes  those  alleged 
private  quarrels  which  in  the  end  involve  every- 
body. It  states  flatly  that  America,  for  example, 
"Is^not  to  remain  mute  while  some  diplomat  fixes 
up  a  war  in  the  Balkans  which  cannot  be  ended 
until  two  million  Americans  are  on  foreign  soil. 
It  says  that  international  duelling  is  over,  and 
that  every  nation  can  discuss  the  causes  of  a  fight 
before  the  fight  takes  place.  Above  all  it  enables 
any  government  in  the  League  to  arouse  the  pub- 
lic opinion  of  the  world  wherever  a  condition 


A  World  Pool  45 

appears  which  threatens  the  peace.  The  faith  is 
that  no  quarrel  can  grow  big  enough  to  justify 
war  when  the  peoples  who  must  do  the  fighting 
know  about  it  soon  enough. 


VII 

ALTERNATIVES 

REMAINS  the  question  of  our  own  adher- 
ence to  the  covenant.  This  is  not  to  be 
answered  easily,  and  I  think  we  may  well 
congratulate  ourselves  upon  the  appearance 
of  a  genuine  and  respectable  opposition.  It  will 
insure  a  thorough  examination  of  the  whole  prob- 
lem and  we  shall  enter  the  League,  if  at  all,  as  a 
democratic  people  should. 

It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  make  a  somewhat 
tedious  analysis  of  America's  position  in  the 
world  as  a  result  of  the  war. 

Previous  to  1900  the  continent  of  Europe  was 
divided  into  coalitions — the  Triplice,  consisting 
of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy,  and  the  Dual 
Alliance  of  France  and  Russia.  England  still 
played  the  role  of  guardian  over  the  balance  of 
power.  In  the  years  leading  up  to  the  war,  the 
aggressiveness  of  Germany  grew  with  her  power, 
and  moved  in  two  directions — ^towards  Turkey 

46 


Alternatives  47 


across  the  Balkans,  where  it  conflicted  with 
Russian  claims,  and  towards  naval  power  where 
it  threatened  England's  security.  Gradually  Eng- 
land was  drawn  away  from  mere  guardian- 
ship, and  forced  to  throw  her  weight  to  Russia 
and  France.  The  balance  tipped  so  far  in  favor 
of  Germany  that  England's  whole  weight  had 
to  be  thrown  into  the  scales  to  right  it.  Even  the 
defection  of  Italy,  foreshadowed  in  the  Tripoli- 
tan  war,  did  not  restrain  the  increasing  aggress- 
iveness of  the  Central  Powers.  So  when  the  war 
began,  Europe  was  divided  into  two  coalitions 
of  such  nearly  equal  strength  that  three  years  of 
furious  warfare  failed  to  break  the  deadlock.  In 
all  this  America  was  the  neutral,  and  though  the 
issue  between  the  two  coalitions  involved  the 
existence  of  small  nations,  and  the  survival  of 
liberal  governments,  there  was  no  body  of  con- 
siderable opinion  which  proposed  to  enter  the  war 
on  those  grounds  alone. 

It  was  only  when  Germany  brought  the  sub- 
marine into  use,  and  threatened  to  disintegrate 
sea  power  that  Americans  felt  themselves  men- 
aced. There  was  no  difference  in  principle  here 
between  Roosevelt  and  Wilson.    Mr.  Roosevelt 


48  The  Political  Scene 

would  have  gone  to  war  when  the  Lusitania  was 
sunk;  Mr.  Wilson  went  to  war  when  diplomacy 
had  failed  to  mitigate  the  submarine  attack. 
Neither  of  them  proposed  to  go  to  war  before 
the  submarine  appeared.  As  President,  Mr. 
Roosevelt  would  perhaps  have  protested  against 
the  violation  of  Belgium :  Mr.  Wilson  to-day  may 
feel  that  he  wishes  he  had  done  it.  But  both, 
in  fact,  were  driven  to  action  only  when  the 
threat  against  sea  power  became  real. 

This  is  a  very  significant  matter,  for  a  response 
of  this  kind  arises  out  of  the  deepest  political 
interests  of  a  nation.  Both  were  American 
statesmen,  and  neither  felt  a  real  menace  to 
American  life  until  the  control  of  the  seas  was 
endangered.  The  conflict  came  home  to  us,  as 
the  saying  is,  when  the  aggression  reached  the 
world's  highways  and  struck  at  the  basis  of 
mastery  by  the  naval  powers.  Then  we  entered 
the  war,  saying  that  the  autocracy  of  Germany 
must  be  overthrown  and  the  rights  of  democracy 
safeguarded.  What  we  have  perhaps  not  so 
clearly  realized,  and  yet  must  realize,  is  that  the 
protection  of  democracy,  as  we  understand  it,  is 
built  upon  the  joint  administration  of  sea  power 


Alternatives  49 


by  the  British  Empire  and  America.  Our  own 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  built  upon  it  from  its  incep- 
tion to  the  present  day.  Though  we  often  talk 
as  if  we  were  the  only  great  power  in  the  western 
hemisphere,  as  a  matter  of  plain  fact  we  are  the 
closest  neighbors  of  the  British  Empire  at  every 
vital  point.  So  habitual  and  so  unobtrusive  has 
this  relation  become  that  we  almost  forget  its 
existence.  But  it  exists  mightily,  and  if  we  have 
enjoyed  a  century  of  immunity  from  European 
aggressions  the  real  cause  lies  in  the  successful 
maintenance  by  England  of  a  balance  of  power 
upon  the  continent.  We  have  never  had  the  navy 
or  the  army  to  enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
against  a  European  coalition  and  it  is  a  mischie- 
vous form  of  self-deception  to  proceed  on  the 
theory  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been 
respected  simply  because  we  willed  it.  It  was  a 
principle  of  English  policy  fully  as  much  as  ours, 
because  the  English  realized  that  the  security  of 
the  Empire  over  large  areas  was  protected  by  it. 

Now,  after  the  most  serious  threat  ever 
directed  against  sea  power,  Britain  and  America 
emerge  the  undisputed  leaders  of  world  politics. 
Their  common  purposes  are  irresistible,  and  the 


50  The  Political  Scene 

destiny  of  all  governments  is  for  the  moment  in 
their  hands. 

How  that  joint  power  shall  be  used  is  the  heart 
of  the  world's  problem.  How,  then,  shall  it  be 
used  ?  There  are  some  who  would  seem  to  favor 
a  course  by  which  we  should  find  ourselves  pre- 
paring for  Wclr  with  Britain.  They  do  not  say 
so  publicly,  to  be  sure,  but  they  dream  of  sup- 
planting Great  Britain  as  mistress  of  the  seas. 
That  means  war.  They  may  not  face  the  fact 
now,  but  it  is  a  fact — sea  power  cannot  be 
divided  permanently.  Britain  may  wield  it; 
America,  after  a  disastrous  war,  might  snatch  it 
from  her.  The  two  together  can  wield  it.  But 
they  cannot  each  wield  parts  of  it  for  any  length 
of  time,  because  after  a  period  of  competition 
war  seems  preferable  to  perpetual  menace.  The 
control  of  the  seas  is  so  delicate  and  so  funda- 
mental that  it  is  impossible  to  leave  it  in  dispute. 
Naval  competition  makes  naval  war,  not  a  prob- 
ability, but  a  certainty. 

Another  school,  realizing  this  and  smacking  its 
lips  over  the  concentration  of  power  under  Anglo- 
American  control,  looks  to  a  permanent  alliance 
as  the  basis  of  a  good  headstrong  foreign  policy. 


Alternatives  51 


Since  America  and  Britain  temporarily  control 

the  world's  destiny,  why  not  continue,  and  profit 

by  it?    This  is  the  policy  of  imperialist  alliance, 

and  it  leads  straight  to  those  very  entanglements 

against  which  Washington  warned  the  nation.  A 

mere  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  between  two      X 

or  three  powers  means  in  practice  that  each  has 

to  back  the  other's  ambitions  and  mistakes.    It  is 

a  method  of  whetting  the  worst  appetites  of  each, 

and  of  committing  both  to  all  the  troublesome- 

ness  of  either.    Such  a  policy  would  soon  awaken 

against  us  first  the  jealousy  and  then  the  enmity 

of  the  excluded  nations.  The  masses  of  the  world 7 

are  stirring;  they  will  not  long  trust  themselves  T  V* 

to  any  selfish  combination  of  powers,  no  matter  \ 

how  idealistic  their  present  purposes  may  be^ 

An  alliance  would  be  a  temporary  thing,  for  there  A  ^. 

is  too  much  disruptive  energy  in  the  world  to   \/ 

tolerate  it  long. 

There  is  only  one  other  course,  and  that  is  to    / 
make  Anglo-American  sea  power  the  nucleus  of  j 
world  organization,  to  guarantee  its  uses  before 
the  whole  world,  to  bind  ourselves  in  honor  to 
employ  it  only  for  the  security  of  all  nations. 
That  is  what  the  League  does.    The  actual  own- 


52  The  Political  Scene 

ership  of  power  remains  in  British  and  American 
hands,  but  its  uses  are  stipulated  in  a  covenant. 
By  this  we  avoid  the  dangers  of  competition  and 
alliance,  while  retaining  the  possession  of  the 
necessary  force  against  an  emergency  in  case  the 
League  were  destroyed.  Anglo-American  sea 
power,  fortified  by  the  abolition  of  neutrality, 
becomes  the  ultimate  guarantor  of  the  world's 
affairs.  It  is  the  force  by  which  such  liberties 
\        as  we  may  devise  are  finally  secured. 

This  is  not  the  old  isolation.  There  is  no 
denying  that.  But  so  far  as  mortal  man  can  see 
into  an  extremely  perplexing  future,  this  pro- 
gram can  if  intelligently  administered  be  made  to 
serve  the  same  ends.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century  we  were  a  weak  people  and 
the  neighbors  of  a  string  of  weak  republics  which 
had  just  secured  their  independence.  In  Europe 
a  great  war  had  ended  with  the  triumph  on  the 
continent  of  autocracies  which  hated  republics 
and  were  resolved  to  crush  them.  Taking  ad- 
vantage of  England's  position  and  her  liberalism 
President  Monroe  proclaimed  the  doctrine  that 
\  ^  this  hemisphere  must  remain  safe  for  democracy. 

"*^^  Now,  a  century  later,  another  great  war  has 


Alternatives  53 


closed  in  which  those  autocracies  are  crushed  and 
a  string  of  weak  republics  has  risen  from  their 
ruins.  We  stand  as  the  richest  and  strongest 
power  in  the  world,  and  our  intervention  decided 
the  issue.  In  spite  of  our  strength  we  have  re- 
mained true  to  those  very  things  which  we  ^  Z^ 
proclaimed  when  we  were  young  and  weak. 
European  peoples  seeing  this  miracle,  for  mira- 
cle it  is  to  the  continental  mind,  have  turned 
to  us  with  such  faith  as  was  never  before  given 
to  a  distant  people.  They  have  heard  an  Ameri- 
can president  announce  their  liberation  and  prom- 
ise their  safety,  and  while  the  war  was  engaged 
they  heard  no  dissent  because  in  fact  there  was 
none.  They  have  taken  his  word  as  America's, 
and  built  their  hopes  upon  it. 

Perhaps  it  was  wrong  of  him  to  arouse  such 
expectations.  Certainly  it  would  have  been  wiser 
if  he  had  acted  less  singly  in  committing  the 
nation.  But  nevertheless,  there  was  opportunity 
to  object,  and  no  formal  objection  was  made. 
Our  honor  is  consequently  very  seriously  involved 
in  the  President's  promises. 


J 


VIII 

AMENDMENTS 

IT  cannot  be  asserted  too  often  that  the  indis- 
pensable action  to  .be  taken  at  Paris  is  to 
provide  for  a  continuous  meeting.  Nothing  else 
in  the  Twenty-Six  Articles  can  be  regarded  as 
beyond  the  reach  of  criticism  and  amendment. 
Let  it  be  agreed  now,  that  in  one  form  or  another 
the  contacts  which  exist  shall  not  be  broken,  and 
it  becomes  not  only  possible  but  desirable  that  the 
covenant  should  be  subjected  to  drastic  examina- 
tion. Revision  need  not  delay  the  making  of  the 
Peace  Treaty,  because  the  Congress  of  Versailles 
— if  it  does  not  adjourn — can  adequately  per- 
form the  immediate  tasks  of  the  League.  For  at 
bottom  the  League  is  merely  the  conference  made 
permanent,  and  the  conference  is  quite  competent 
to  make  the  necessary  decisions  of  the  next  half 
a  dozen  months,  while  a  more  adequate  instru- 
ment is  provided  out  of  the  provisional  text  con- 
tained in  the  Twenty-Six  Articles. 

54 


Amendments  55 


The  document  itself  exhibits  all  the  marks  of 
haste  and  patching.  General  principles,  agencies, 
procedure  are  scattered  through  the  various  arti- 
cles in  considerable  confusion,  and  one  has  to 
search  through  most  of  the  covenant  to  discover 
the  complete  doctrine  on  any  specific  point.  For 
example,  why  having  read  Articles  VII,  VIII, 
and  IX  on  the  subject  of  armaments,  does  one 
suddenly  discover  another  provision  on  the  sub- 
ject in  XVIII  ?  What  is  the  meaning  of  "  free- 
dom of  transit  and  equitable  treatment "  in  XXI, 
and  howdpes  it  relate  itself  to  X  where  "  political 
independence  *'  is  guaranteed  ?  Does  this  same 
X  mean  that  the  boundaries  to  be  fixed  at  Ver- 
sailles are  immutable,  or  simply  that  they  cannot 
be  changed  by  threat  of  war?  Does  this  X  mean 
that  if  a  state  once  member  of  the  League  col- 
lapses through  misgovernment  the  mandatory 
principle  cannot  be  applied  to  it  ? 

Apart  from  these  general  and  technical  diffi- 
culties there  are  certain  specific  criticisms  to  be 
made. 

The  covenant  is  very  difficult  to  amend.  Now 
an  organic  law  which  is  virtually  unchangeable 
should  not  burden  itself  with  those  abstract  nega- 


^6  The  Political  Scene 

tive  principles,  which  are  the  refuge  of  obstruc- 
tionists. Article  X,  guaranteeing  territorial 
integrity  and  existing  political  independence,  is 
of  this  type.  It  is  an  article  of  distrust,  an  effort 
to  be  wiser  than  the  next  generation,  and  to  curb 
the  action  of  the  future  by  a  magic  set  of  words. 
Contrast  it  with  Article  XI,  which  makes  it  a 
"  friendly  right "  to  draw  attention  to  circum- 
stances which  threaten  peace  and  understanding. 
X  binds  the  League  in  a  formula;  XI  releases  the 
League  for  an  active  policy  of  conciliation.  The 
one  is  restrictive,  the  other  permissive,  and  the 
two  clauses  bark  at  each  other.  X  is  one  of 
those  grand  generalities  behind  which  every 
opponent  of  change  can  barricade  himself.  He 
can  always  declare  that  anything  he  does  not  like 
is  "  external  aggression "  against  his  political 
independence,  and  there  is  always  sure  to  be  some 
nation  ready  to  vote  against  a  unanimous  recom- 
mendation. 

The  clause  will  not  protect  a  nation's  independ- 
ence against  the  kind  of  economic  penetration 
which  to-day  constitutes  the  chief  mode  of  con- 
quest. But  it  will  protect  a  government  in  bad 
practices  and  oppressions.     It  will  hamper  the 


Amendments  57 


honorable  nations  by  ruling  out  interference;  it 
will  assist  the  dishonorable  governments  who 
have  learned  to  manipulate  affairs  in  a  costume 
of  legality.  It  may  put  minorities  beyond  the 
scope  of  the  League's  protection,  and  enforce  the 
privilege  of  the  oppressing  state.  Moreover,  it 
puts  a  premium  upon  insincerity.  In  the  actual 
conduct  of  human  affairs  there  is  an  increasing 
limitation  of  political  dependence  resulting  from 
the  necessities  of  economic  cooperation.  Those 
necessities  are  stronger  than  any  political  axiom, 
and  will  prevail.  But  under  Article  X  they  will 
prevail  in  roundabout  fashion  and  furtively.  The 
framers  of  the  covenant,  and  the  majority  of 
well-informed  people  do  not  believe  that  a  state 
can  do  what  it  pleases  within  its  own  boundaries. 
In  the  future  men  will  believe  it  still  less,  for  they 
are  discovering  that  "international  relations" 
are  after  all  nothing  but  the  result  of  what  goes 
on  within  the  different  nations.  Surely  at  the 
end  of  this  war  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  the 
"  political  independence  "  of  empires  like  that  of 
the  Hohenzollerns,  Hapsburgs,  and  Sultan  is  not 
something  the  world  can  afford  to  regard  as 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  League. 


58  The  Political  Scene 

The  Article  should  be  revised.  The  preamble 
contains  all  that  is  valuable  in  it  without  setting 
up  a  piece  of  political  dogmatism  derived  from  the 
eighteenth  century.  Provided  that  international 
law  is  given  binding  sanctions,  it  is  not  the  busi- 
ness of  this  generation  to  put  the  substance  of 
that  law  in  a  straitjacket.  When  we  have  agreed 
that  law  is  binding  we  have  given  all  the  neces- 
sary guarantees.  What  the  law  is  to  be  in  specific 
cases  must  be  determined  on  the  facts  as  they  are 
developed  by  events.  There  is  every  reason  to 
believe,  for  example,  that  sooner  or  later  the 
world  will  require  a  far  greater  regulation  of 
international  trade  than  any  one  has  yet  dared  to 
suggest.  The  experiences  of  the  war  point  that 
way.  They  indicate  the  impossibility  of  per- 
mitting unfair  trade  practices  between  sup- 
posedly friendly  nations,  or  of  profiteering  by 
governments,  or  the  use  of  monopolies  as  a 
means  of  conquest.  The  conferees  at  Paris  have 
'avoided  these  matters  in  the  draft.  Perhaps  they 
had  to.  But  statesmen  in  the  future  may  not  be 
able  to  avoid  them,  and  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom 
to  eliminate  any  dogmatic  rule  now  which  might 
exclude  such  action. 


Amendments  59 


If  the  covenant  is  to  serve  through  the  perils 
that  confront  the  next  generation,  flexibility  and 
the  possibilities  of  growth  must  be  assured.  To 
attempt,  in  the  organic  law,  to  go  beyond  "  in- 
struments '*  to  legislation  is  to  turn  our  back  upon 
a  century  of  experience  with  written  constitu- 
tions. No  printed  text  can  govern  the  energies  of 
a  generation,  but  it  can  stifle  the  more  inventive 
but  scrupulous  minds.  When  we  have  accepted 
the  League  we  intend  to  abide  by  its  spirit  and  its 
letter;  let  us  not,  then,  tie  ourselves  up  in  the 
presence  of  those  who  may  use  the  letter  of  it 
to  defeat  the  spirit.  That  we  can  do  by  eliminat- 
ing the  negatives. 

We  can  do  it  also  by  enlarging  the  "  instru- 
mentalities." The  Presidents  own  experience 
shows  how  necessary  it  is  to  secure  the  intimate 
cooperation  of  executive  and  legislature,  majority 
and  minority,  if  the  action  of  the  League  is  not 
to  be  balked.  No  meeting  of  executives  alone  is 
sufficient  to  bind  the  nations,  and  it  is  a  stultifica- 
tion of  democratic  control  to  erect  a  structure  on 
the  theory  that  the  legislature  will  accept  the 
commitments  of  the  executive  after  they  are 
made.     In  parliamentary  countries  the  ministry 


6o  The  Political  Scene 

will  fall  if  its  representatives  make  commitments 
of  which  the  legislature  disapproves.  Under 
congressional  government  the  result  is  likely  to 
be  a  deadlock. 

Inevitably,  the  mere  act  of  securing  agreement 
under  the  machinery  of  the  League  is  impossible 
unless  the  delegates  are  capable  of  speaking  with 
assurance  for  their  countries.  And  having 
spoken,  having  reached  a  complicated  agreement, 
it  is  infinitely  confusing  to  throw  the  whole  busi- 
ness back  to  the  legislature  for  revision.  A  dis- 
agreement between  House  and  Senate  is  nothing 
to  what  a  disagreement  between  the  legislatures 
of  many  nations  would  be.  The  only  solution 
apparently  is  to  have  the  legislative  branch  partic- 
ipate in  the  original  discussion,  so  that  it  is  not 
confronted  each  time  with  an  accomplished  fact. 
To  be  sure,  the  whole  legislature  of  every  state 
cannot  be  at  the  seat  of  the  League,  but  there 
is  no  obvious  reason  why  delegates  from  its 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  should  not  be  pres- 
ent to  consult  with  the  executive  and  with  foreign 
legislators  to  share  the  responsibilities,  and  advise 
during  the  course  of  the  negotiations.  Both  the 
administration  parties  and  the  opposition  parties 


Amendments  6i 


would  thus  be  on  the  ground,  and  the  resulting 
commitment  would  have  a  surer  basis. 

Unless  Congress  is  to  abandon  power  over 
foreign  affairs,  except  the  power  to  obstruct,  it 
will  insist  upon  representation  of  the  legislature 
in  the  structure  of  the  League.  Formally,  this 
representation  need  be  nothing  more  than  advis- 
ory, but  the  advice  should  be  in  the  course,  and 
not  at  the  end,  of  the  negotiations.  It  is  no 
question  of  trusting  or  distrusting  Mr.  Wilson. 
I  trust  him  beyond  any  statesman  in  the  world 
to-day.  It  is  a  matter  of  the  future,  when  Mr. 
Wilson  will  be  a  private  citizen,  and  when  per- 
haps some  other  person  will  be  in  the  White 
House  who  needs  to  be  checked  by  Congress. 
Above  all,  it  is  a  matter  of  downright  democratic 
responsibility  which  the  legislature  cannot 
abandon,  no  matter  how  excellent  a  President 
may  be.  Finally,  it  is  a  necessity,  as  politics  is 
managed  to-day.  No  government  on  the  conti- 
nent of  Europe  is  rooted  deeply  in  the  affections 
of  the  masses.  Those  who  are  now  at  Paris  may 
not  all  be  there  a  few  months  hence.  No  man 
knows  who  will  rise  to  power.  But  this  covenant 
is  supposed  to  be  a  League  not  of  governments 


62  The  Political  Scene 

but  of  nations,  and  that  implies  that  the  com- 
plexion of  political  parties  must  be  represented. 
The  opposition  of  to-day  may  be  the  government 
to-morrow.  Surely  it  is  nothing  but  common 
sense  to  ask  that  the  leaders  of  the  opposition 
should  remain  in  the  closest  personal  touch  with 
the  affairs  of  the  League. 

The  value  of  this  participation  does  not  end 
here.     Everyone  knows  that  even  with  the  best 
will  in  the  world,  each  legislature  is  enormously 
preoccupied  with  purely  local  affairs,  and  that  its 
contact  with  international  politics  is  meager.   Yet 
the  texture  of  diplomacy  is  largely  made  out  of 
the  acts  of  legislatures.     If  the  world  is  to  have 
peace  and  understanding  some  means  must  be 
found  of  creating  a  community  of  feeling  be- 
tween parliaments.     They  should  have  ways  of 
debating  with  one  another  as  well  as  within  their 
own  chambers.    The  opposition,  no  less  than  the 
administration,  should  have  direct  access  to  that 
subtle  but  decisive   information  which  can  be 
obtained  only  by  being  on  the  spot.     Had  Mr. 
Lodge  been  in  Paris,  studying  the  confidential 
reports,  and  talking  to  responsible  European  offi- 
cials, had  he  been  made  to  feel  that  what  he 


Amendments  63 


thought  really  matters,  as  it  undoubtedly  does, 
he  would  insensibly  have  tended  to  forget  that  his 
role  was  officially  that  of  opposing  what  Demo- 
crats propose.  And  when  he  returned  to  Wash- 
ington Republican  senators  would  have  listened 
to  him  as  they  will  never  listen  to  Mr.  Wilson. 
In  other  words,  it  is  necessary  to  expose  the 
opposition  to  the  same  influences,  and  the  same 
information,  if  any  settled  national  policy  is  to 
emerge.  What  is  true  of  Mr.  Lodge  is  equally 
true  of  the  extreme  left.  The  irreconcilable  radi- 
cal is  ever  so  much  less  irreconcilable  when  he  can 
express  himself  and  when  he  has  to  share  respon- 
sibility. Now  the  irreconcilable  radical  is  a  very 
considerable  person  in  the  modern  world,  and 
once  he  becomes  convinced  that  the  League  is  a 
secret  manipulation  he  will  be  equally  convinced 
that  it  is  a  sinister  manipulation.  Deny  him  the 
chance  to  protest  and  to  advise,  he  will  certainly 
attack  and  condemn. 

It  will  be  difficult  enough  in  all  conscience  to 
secure  harmony  in  a  League  when  half  the  world 
is  socialist  and  the  other  half  anti-socialist.  By 
calling  in  representatives  of  the  elected  parlia- 
ments this  schism  can  be  modified  and  an  indis- 


64  The  Political  Scene 

pensable  bridge  built  between  the  conservative 
governments  and  the  more  radical  masses.  M. 
Clemenceau,  for  example,  loves  France,  but  he 
will  never  have  the  confidence  of  Socialist 
Europe,  and  anything  he  does  is  suspect  to  it. 
But  M.  Thomas  also  loves  France;  yet  he  can 
converse  with  socialists.  Mr.  Henderson  can 
work  for  understanding  in  groups  when  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  can  produce  only  a  rhetori- 
cal explosion.  So  if  the  League  is  not  to  find 
itself  marooned  on  the  dry  sands  of  irrele- 
vance it  should  take  steps  to  introduce  into  its 
own  structure  the  conciliatory  influence  of  the 
opposition  parties. 

Conciliatory  they  are,  and  I  do  not  see  how 
any  sane  person  could  wish  them  to  be  anything 
else.  Senator  Lodge  talks  menacingly  about 
building  bridges  across  chasms  to  anarchy,  but 
unless  the  bridges  to  moderate  radicalism  are 
maintained  anarchy  will  follow.  For  there  is 
just  one  sure  protection  against  those  things 
which  Senator  Lodge  and  most  of  the  rest  of  us 
fear.  That  protection  does  not  consist  in  play- 
ing the  ostrich,  nor  does  it  consist  in  losing  your 
head  and  trying  to  stamp  on  those  who  wish  to 


Amendments  65 


make  life  too  decent  to  be  the  breeding  place  of 
anarchy.  It  consists  in  remembering  the  very 
wise  remark  of  the  British  Prime  Minister  that 
he  feared  reaction  more  than  Bolshevism.  For 
everything  depends  on  where  you  think  the 
chasm  is.  If  you  think  it  begins  at  a  line  drawn 
sharply  along  the  frontiers  of  Senator  Lodge's 
mind,  then  I  fear  most  of  us  will  find  ourselves 
on  the  other  side  of  the  chasm.  But  if  you  put 
the  frontier  far  enough  to  the  left  so  as  to  in- 
clude that  huge  majority  of  men  who  want 
change,  and  are  not  yet  blind  with  desperation, 
there  is  no  reason  to  fear  anarchy  here.  Bol- 
shevism is  extraordinarily  easy  to  combat  in  a 
well-fed  country,  and  its  existence  is  a  sign  of 
disgraceful  incompetence  in  the  governing  cir- 
cles. Bolshevism  arises  only  where  rulers  have 
made  a  botch  of  their  duties,  and  one  of  the  sure 
ways  of  making  a  botch  of  them  is  to  close  your 
mind  to  the  loyal  opposition. 


IX  / 

BOLSHEVISM 

THE  League  can  be  made  the  instrument  by 
which  the  disrooted  populations  of  the 
world  may  readjust  themselves  peacefully. 
It  can  be.  It  may  not  be.  If  there  is  not 
enough  imagination  and  courage  applied  to  the 
policies  for  which  the  instrument  is  used,  it  is 
altogether  probable  that  the  complete  collapse  of 
established  authority  will  follow.  It  is  entirely 
true  that  if  authority  is  to  be  preserved  and  the 
transition  controlled,  the  Western  powers  will 
have  to  listen  to  those  men  whose  minds  are  un- 
poisoned  by  their  own  fears  and  their  own  hates. 
The  peril  is  too  real  for  self-indulgence  in  the 
lazy  repetition  of  war  cries,  and  those  who  are 
really  bent  on  preserving  the  order  of  the  world 
cannot  allow  themselves  to  be  silenced  by  those 
moral  terrorists  who  are  pretending  to  save 
civilization  by  dividing  it. 

The  hop'fe  of  world  order  to-day  is  confronted 

66 


Bolshevism  67 


by  the  diminishing  faith  of  vast  masses  of  people, 
who  have  seen  governments  bungle,  falter  and 
send  men  uselessly  to  death.  They  have  seen 
governments  blinded  by  privileged  groups  and 
favoritism,  and  cowed  by  the  forces  of  reaction; 
they  are  angry  and  fiercely  distrustful.  They 
have  borne  the  pain  of  the  most  extensive  calam- 
ity in  human  history,  and  they  hct/e'b'ttle  more 
to  lose.  They  sit  restlessly  in  awful  judgment 
upon  the  Lodges  of  the  world.  Their  theories 
are  a  tiny  part  of  their  true  feelings.  What 
holds  them  from  almost  universal  despair  and 
dissolution  is  a  lingering  hope  that  perhaps  there 
is  still  enough  generosity  and  mercy  left  in 
Western  statecraft  to  meet  the  issue.  They  are 
still  turned,  though  skeptically,  to  the  America 
which  Wilson  has  described  to  them.  For  Amer- 
ica did  the  incredible  thing  among  governments. 
It  fought  without  selfish  purpose.  It  waged  a 
clean  war,  and  thereby  made  itself  the  strongest 
pillar  of  faith  in  authority  standing  intact  in  the 
world  to-day.  It  is  a  terrifying  thing  rather  than 
a  cause  of  vanity  that  this  should  be  so. 

Americans  did  not  plan  to  have  thrust  upon 
them  such  responsibilities  as  these.     The  army 


68  The  Political  Scene 

went  humbly  to  the  veterans  of  France.  The 
American  people  intended  to  follow  rather  than 
to  lead  their  Allies.  But  when  the  actual  situa- 
tion of  Europe  was  revealed,  they  found  their 
own  diffidence  a  source  of  confidence  in  others. 
The  goodness  or  badness  of  all  this  is  a  trivial 
question  compared  to  the  fact  that  it  represents 
the  truth  -^.hoiit  the  world  to-day,  and  a  with- 
dnwal  by  America  from  the  position  she  occu- 
pies will  be  the  signal  for  a  European  revolution. 
The  imminence  of  that  revolution  is  the  domi- 
nating thought  of  all  men  everywhere.  Lenin 
and  Liebknecht  sit  in  the  Council  at  Paris,  and 
their  voices  are  heard  in  every  discussion.  It  is 
with  them  that  the  world  is  negotiating  to-day 
for  its  own  preservation.  Those  negotiations 
are  watched  intensely  through  the  crevices  of 
publicity  which  the  Peace  Conference  permits. 
But  cutting  across  this  basic  negotiation  are  a 
thousand  strands  of  special  claim  and  ambition 
to  interrupt  and  entangle.  Some  one  wants  a 
piece  of  land,  some  one  else  wants  to  make 
money,  another  wants  to  work  a  little  intrigue, 
and  this  stuff  of  the  old  diplomacy  obscures 
vision,  and  distorts  the  proceedings.    The  direct 


Bolshevism  69 


business  of  the  conference  is  to  feed  the  world, 
set  it  to  work,  and  reconcile  its  people.  Whoever 
impedes  that  is  fiddling  for  a  disaster.  What- 
ever prevents  the  existing  governments  in  Eu- 
rope from  reestablishing  normal  life  encourages 
those  who  say  that  the  existing  governments  are 
damned  and  that  there  is  no  salvation  in  them. 

The  reason  why  Lenin  may  succeed  is  that  the 
victors  do  not  take  seriously  enough  what  he  rep- 
resents. They  are  frightened  to  be  sure,  they 
are  even  panicky,  but  they  are  not  serious  enough 
about  the  menace  to  be  willing  to  subordinate 
every  other  consideration  to  the  creation  of  a 
Europe  which  will  be  sterile  to  Bolshevism. 
They  want  to  fight  Lenin  with  one  hand  and  use 
the  other  for  their  own  purposes.  They  are  re- 
peating the  error  of  those  who  wanted  to  win 
the  war  and  at  the  same  time  continue  to  do 
business  as  usual. 

Out  of  this  desire  arise  those  ingenious  dip- 
lomatic futilities  by  which  the  old  intrigue  is  to 
be  maintained  as  a  method  of  crushing  the  Bol- 
shevist power.  Having  realized  that  the  armies 
of  France  and  Great  Britain  cannot  be  used  to 
police  Russia,  and  that  the  American  people  do 


70  The  Political  Scene 

not  intend  to  bury  half  a  million  boys  in  a  wild- 
erness for  ten  years  or  so,  the  idea  of  direct 
military  intervention  has  been  abandoned,  and 
for  it  has  been  substituted  the  fashionable  phrase 
"  sanitary  cordon."  The  theory  is  that  a  dam 
is  to  be  erected  in  the  east  of  Europe  consisting 
of  Poland,  Czecho-Slovakia,  a  Greater  Rumania, 
and  Jugo-Slavia,  and  statesmen  representing 
these  nations  have  actually  been  found  who  are 
willing  to  have  their  countries  used  as  a  dam. 
These  new  and  fragile  republics  are  to  be  erected 
between  Bolshevist  Russia,  Communist  Hungary 
and  Spartacide  Germany.  Then  another  dam  is 
to  be  erected  on  the  Rhine,  and  the  whole  thing 
guaranteed  by  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
and  America  disguised  as  a  League  of  Nations. 
This  is  a  very  dangerous  bit  of  fooling.  No 
one  who  knows  anything  of  the  internal  condi- 
tions of  the  new  states  of  eastern  Europe  can 
for  a  moment  imagine  that  they  will  survive 
squeezed  in  between  gigantic  revolutions  in  both 
Germany  and  Russia.  Those  new  states  are 
fragments  of  destroyed  empires,  and  each  con- 
tains within  itself  problems  that  have  all  the 
seeds  of  disorder.    Each  one  moreover  is  at  least 


Bolshevism  71 


partially  in  the  hands  of  men  whose  ideas  reflect 
the  old  imperial  system,  with  the  result  that  there 
has  been  through  the  winter  a  tangle  of  little 
wars  on  the  frontiers  of  all  of  them.  One  Am- 
erican observer  returning  in  January  from  what 
was  Austria-Hungary  had  accounted  for  eleven 
separate  military  campaigns  going  on  in  the  sani- 
tary cordon. 

The  motive  for  using  these  little  states  as  the 
buffer  of  the  world  is  clear.  It  is  to  evade  the 
disagreeable  necessity  of  effecting  a  reconcilia- 
tion between  the  German  people  and  the  Western 
nations.  If  the  cordon  can  be  made  to  stand  up 
it  is  possible  to  keep  Germany  prostrate  and  to 
escape  the  danger  to  Europe  if  her  people  become 
desperate;  the  new  states  are  to  be  an  iron  fence 
dividing  two  areas  of  Bolshevism  from  each 
other.  This  is  a  more  complicated  version  of 
what  was  tried  at  Brest-Li  to  vsk,  the  scheme 
there  was  to  use  these  same  border  states  as  a 
buffer,  and  then  to  paralyze  Russia  by  splitting 
off  the  Ukraine.  The  new  version  is  to  use  these 
states  as  a  buffer  facing  two  ways,  and  to  paralyze 
Germany  by  splitting  off  a  Rhenish  republic.  It 
would  require  as  its  first  condition  the  mainte- 


72  The  Political  Scene 

nance  for  an  indefinite  period  of  a  huge  army  on 
the  Rhine.  With  Germany  in  profound  dis- 
order, as  it  will  be,  if  food  is  not  given  and 
factories  set  going  and  the  burden  of  debt  made 
bearable,  the  occupation  of  Germany  would  have 
to  follow.  For  Bolshevism  in  both  Russia  and 
Germany  would  soon  eat  the  heart  out  of  Po- 
land, Rumania,  and  Hungary  where  social  condi- 
tions are  already  desperate.  Now  any  one  who 
supposes  that  the  populations  of  France  and 
Great  Britain  will  endure  the  human  and  econ- 
omic cost  of  such  an  occupation  is  suffering  from 
a  severe  case  of  reading  nothing  but  censored 
news. 

r  The  plain  fact  is  that  the  reconstruction  of 
Europe  requires  an  orderly  government  and  a 
contented  population  in  Germany.  The  very 
existence  of  the  new  states  depends  upon  protect- 
ing their  flanks  against  revolution.  A  moderate 
socialist  republic  in  Germany,  such  as  the  Ebert 
government  represents,  is  the  only  type  of  gov- 
ernment in  central  Europe  to-day  which  can 
make  that  part  of  the  world  immune  against  the 
disorder  which  is  traveling  westward.  If  what 
Ebert  represents  is  a  failure,  if  it  cannot  pre- 


Bolshevism  73 


serve  Germany  from  dismemberment  and  a  long 
economic  bondage,  then  the  only  alternatives 
open  are  to  restore  the  Hohenzollerns  or  to  give 
up  in  desperation,  repudiate  all  authority  and 
obligation  and  go  Bolshevist.  Of  the  three  pos- 
sible Germanys — Junker,  Ebert,  or  Spartacide, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Eberf  s  is  the  one 
with  which  the  world  can  best  live  at  peace. 
But  the  persistence  of  Ebert  depends  entirely 
upon  his  ability  to  extricate  Germany  from  her 
immediate  troubles. 

Now  if  this  were  the  Last  Judgment  it  would 
be  quite  plausible  to  think  of  the  horrors  of  Bel- 
gium and  France,  to  recall  the  exultation  which 
accompanied  the  Lusitania's  destruction,  and  to 
deny  that  it  is  desirable  to  extricate  such  a  people 
from  the  damnation  of  its  defeat.  But  the  Con- 
gress of  Versailles  is  not  the  Last  Judgment;  it 
is  a  meeting  of  statesmen  to  determine  the  fu- 
ture of  mankind,  and  that  freedom  from  respon- 
sibility for  the  future,  as  well  as  the  omnipo- 
tence and  omniscence  of  the  Last  Judgment  are 
denied  to  them.  They  cannot  damn  the  German 
people  for  all  time,  desirable  as  that  might  be,  be- 
cause German  mothers  bear  German  children. 


74  The  Political  Scene 

They  cannot  consign  them  to  the  hell  they  de- 
serve, because  the  location  of  that  hell  will  be 
the  center  of  Europe.  They  are  limited  to  nar- 
row choices  among  present  day  facts — to  an 
economic  and  political  reconciliation  with  the 
Weimar  convention  or  the  victory  of  the  Sparta- 
cides.  Moral  reconciliation  will  come  more 
slowly,  and  not  altogether  until  a  guiltless  gen- 
eration has  grown  to  maturity.  With  the  in- 
dividual grown-up  citizens  of  what  was  the  Ger- 
man Empire  the  resumption  of  spiritual  inter- 
course will  always  depend  upon  a  preliminary 
discussion  of  the  past. 

But  this  feeling  which  wilj  in  varying  degree 
govern  the  conduct  of  Western  peoples  has  no 
place  in  statesmanship.  The  business  of  that 
statesmanship  is  not  to  make  a  sanitary  cordon, 
but  a  sanitary  Europe.  Having  eliminated  the 
dangers  of  a  sudden  Prussian  revival  by  disarm- 
ing the  German  nation  for  war  their  first  concern 
should  be  to  preserve  a  continuous  area  of  stable 
democracy  to  the  frontiers  of  Bolshevist  Russia. 
That  is  the  true  way  to  protect  France,  both 
against  the  hypothetical  peril  of  renewed  aggres- 
sion and  the  actual  peril  of  revolution  within  the 


Bolshevism  75 


next  few  years.  That  is  the  true  way  of  dealing 
with  Lenin's  ambitions  which  will  corrode  an 
army,  but  are  baffled  by  contentment. 

With  a  settlement  in  Europe  which  weaves 
Germany  and  the  new  states  into  the  texture  of 
western  commerce  and  political  life,  the  League 
of  Nations  will  have  a  basis  in  reality  that  it  can 
never  obtain  by  making  a  schism  at  the  Rhine, 
and  throwing  little  states  out  into  the  middle  of 
the  revolutionary  torrent  in  order  to  stem  it. 
For  the  creation  of  a  solid  area  of  liberal  govern- 
ment under  the  aegis  of  the  League  is  prelimi- 
nary to  the  final  problem  of  dealing  with  Lenin. 
The  nations,  with  whose  whole  conception  of 
society  Lenin  is  avowedly  at  war,  can  go  for- 
ward to  deal  with  him  successfully  only  when 
they  have  left  no  formidable  discontent  in  their 
own  rear.  So  long  as  the  nations  of  the  league 
are  perforated  with  maladministration  and  loss 
of  faith  they  are  like  an  army  advancing  while 
its  lines  of  communication  are  cut. 

The  perplexing  thing  about  Bolshevism  is 
that  it  is  primitive.  And  being  primitive  it  is 
formless,  and  has  no  vital  center.  You  can  kill 
a  government  by  occupying  its  capital  and  a  few 


76  The  Political  Scene 

of  its  chief  strategic  points.  Bolshevism  has  no 
strategic  points.  It  is  a  complete  dissolution  of 
centralized  organization  into  local  atoms  of  self- 
government.  These  atoms  have  to  be  stamped 
on  one  by  one,  because  no  one  of  them  is  pro- 
foundly dependent  on  the  others.  That  is  why 
the  policing  of  Russia  would  require  an  enor- 
mous army  distributed  over  its  whole  area.  Now 
even  if  a  sufficient  army  could  be  raised,  which 
it  cannot  be,  the  discipline  of  that  army  would  be 
most  difficult  to  maintain.  An  army  of  occupa- 
tion is  a  bored  and  discontented  army  and  the 
more  successfully  it  maintains  order  the  more 
time  it  has  to  growl  against  the  politicians  and 
wonder  when  it  will  be  allowed  to  go  home. 
Moreover,  no  government  established  by  an 
army  of  occupation  is  likely  to  last  after  the 
army  goes  because  it  bears  the  stigma  of  being 
the  creature  of  the  invading  alien.  The  odium 
of  all  the  privations  which  occurred  during  the 
occupation  is  upon  it,  and  it  is  the  experience  of 
this  war  at  least  that  an  administration  set  up 
by  the  conqueror  has  to  be  escorted  out  of  the 
country  when  the  conqueror  leaves. 

It  is  possible  to  make  war  upon  a  nation  or- 


Bolshevism  77 


ganized  under  a  government.  There  is  no  way 
of  winning  a  war  against  several  hundred  thou- 
sand more  or  less  independent  villages.  Yet  that 
is  the  fundamental  condition  in  Bolshevik  Rus- 
sia to-day.  All  the  ordinary  rules  of  warfare  are 
inapplicable.  And  because  of  this,  the  ordin- 
ary short  cut  of  force  instead  of  negotiation  is 
inapplicable.  The  process  of  redintegration  can- 
not be  pushed  fast  because  all  the  ties  of  habit 
upon  which  government  rests  are  torn.  It  is  not 
possible  to  bully  Russia  into  order,  nor  to  curse 
her  into  it.  She  will  have  to  be  drawn  into  it 
by  reestablishing  the  bonds  of  economic  inter- 
dependence between  her  fragments  and  the  or- 
ganized society  of  the  west. 

To  this  end  a  suggestion  might  perhaps  be 
offered.  As  a  preliminary  to  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Allied  forces  now  operating  in  various  parts 
of  Russia,  agreement  should  be  reached  both 
with  the  local  Soviets  and  with  the  Central  Soviet 
at  Moscow  that  certain  ports  of  the  Arctic,  the 
Baltic,  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Pacific  should  be 
constituted  international  cities  under  the  admin- 
istration of  bodies  appointed  by  the  League  of 
Nations,  and  including  for  this  purpose  repre- 


78  The  Political  Scene 

sentative  of  the  local  and  Central  Soviets.  The 
policing  of  these  ports  would  be  by  naval  forces 
including  marines  authorized  by  the  League.  In 
these  ports  economic  commissions  representing 
the  League  would  be  set  up  with  authority  to 
make  trading  agreements  with  any  soviet,  coop- 
erative society,  trade  union  or  corporation  that 
could  give  the  necessary  guarantees.  The  fail- 
ure to  uphold  the  guarantees  would  be  followed 
by  boycott  of  the  particular  offender.  These 
commissions  would  sell  the  goods  imported  by 
and  exported  for  an  international  trading  cor- 
poration organized  for  the  purpose  by  the  na- 
tions having  commercial  resources  for  the  enter- 
prise. They  could  also  distribute  relief  where 
the  need  existed  without  means  of  payment. 

Now  the  raising  of  the  standards  of  life  re- 
sulting from  this  trading  and  from  relief  might 
gradually  restore  the  contact  of  the  Russian  peo- 
ple with  the  outer  world.  And  with  contact 
would  come  that  sense  of  the  realities  of  govern- 
ment and  business  which  is  necessary  to  the  re- 
vival of  Russia.  The  relation  would  be  delicate, 
and  if  mismanaged  would  certainly  fail.  If  it 
were  used  to  promote  the  counter-revolution,  if 


Bolshevism  79 


these  commissions  were  made  the  centers  of  anti- 
soviet  intrigue,  if  in  short  the  thing  were  done 
in  bad  faith,  the  experiment  would  certainly  col- 
lapse. But  if  it  were  done  humanely,  tolerantly, 
generously,  with  a  high  sense  that  the  Russian 
people  too  have  a  right  to  choose  their  own  ways 
of  life  and  obedience,  it  might  well  undermine 
the  Bolshevist  regime,  and  attach  Soviet  Rus- 
sia to  the  world  community.  By  permitting  the 
members  of  the  League  actual  observation  of 
Russian  affairs  it  might  make  unnecessary  the 
spectacle  of  the  United  States  Senate  trying  to 
inform  itself  about  Russia  by  listening  to  tittle- 
tattle.  By  opening  a  commercial  regime,  it 
might  avert  the  awkwardness  of  attempting  dip- 
lomatic relations  with  a  state  that  denies  all  the 
premises  of  international  relationship.  Finally 
it  might  prevent  whatever  danger  there  may  be 
in  the  single  exploitation  of  Russia  by  a  resur- 
rected Pan-Germany. 


X 

THE  TEST 

THE  three  problems  presented  by  Germany, 
Russia,  and  the  intervening  border  states, 
do  not  exhaust  the  perplexities  which  victory 
has  brought  to  the  victors.  One  has  only  to 
mention  Turkey  and  China.  But  these  prob- 
lems do  indicate  how  pressing  and  practical  is 
the  need  for  an  international  organization  by 
which  the  world  can  be  administered  into  an 
era  of  stability.  No  one  who  has  grasped  those 
problems  as  they  press  upon  mankind  can  per- 
sist in  the  idea  that  peace  consists  in  signing  a 
treaty,  shaking  hands  with  the  Allies,  and  return- 
ing home  to  gaze  in  rapt  admiration  at  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  I  know  this  feeling  quite  well. 
I  have  shared  it,  and  have  wondered  whether 
anything  could  be  done  with  that  jangle  of  mem- 
ories which  so  often  seems  to  be  the  mind  of 
Europe. 

Perhaps  nothing  can  be  done.     Perhaps  the 


The  Test  8l 


memories  and  the  appetites  are  too  strong  to 
save  the  world  from  a  period  of  despair.  Per- 
haps the  men  who  are  meeting  so  secretly  in 
Paris  are  too  much  divided  to  use  the  instru- 
ment of  cooperation  which  they  have  framed. 
We  shall  know  soon  whether  they  have  made  a 
peace  upon  which  a  League  can  operate.  But 
they  shall  not  be  able  to  say  that  they  failed  be- 
cause America  failed  them,  and  that  the  dishonor 
is  hers.  They  shall  not  be  able  to  claim  that  the 
peace  of  the  world  was  shattered  because  the 
strongest  and  safest  of  all  was  too  timid  to  help 
them.  America's  true  policy  in  this  day  is  to 
say  to  Europe:  We  shall  stay  with  you  and 
share  the  decisions  of  the  future  if  you  will  make 
the  peace  we  are  asked  to  share,  a  peace  that 
Europe  will  endure.  But  if  you  make  it  a  peace 
that  can  be  maintained  only  by  the  bayonet  we 
shall  leave  you  to  the  consequences  and  find  our 
own  security  in  this  hemisphere.  It  will  have  to 
be  a  very  bad  peace  indeed  to  justify  any  such 
action  on  our  part,  and  nothing  less  than  that 
would  ever  justify  it. 


APPENDIX  I 

THE  WORLD  CONFLICT  IN  ITS  RELATION 
TO  AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY 


An  address  delivered  before  the  American  Academy  of 
Political  and  Social  Science  at  Philadelphia,  April,  1917. 
Reprinted  as  Senate  Document  No.  80,  65th  Congress  ist 
Session. 


L 

The  way  in  which  President  Wilson  directed 
America's  entrance  into  the  war  has  had  a 
mighty  effect  on  the  public  opinion  of  the  world. 
Many  of  those  who  are  disappointed  or  pleased 
say  they  are  surprised.  They  would  not  be  sur- 
prised had  they  made  it  their  business  this  last 
year  to  understand  the  policy  of  their  Govern- 
ment. 

In  May,  19 16,  the  President  made  a  speech 
which  will  be  counted  among  the  two  or  three 
decisive  utterances  of  American  foreign  policy. 
The  Sussex  pledge  had  just  been  extracted  from 
the   German   Government,   and   on   the   surface 

83 


84  The  Political  Scene 

American  neutrality  seemed  assured.  The 
speech  was  an  announcement  that  American  iso- 
lation was  ended,  and  that  we  were  prepared  to 
join  a  League  of  Peace.  This  was  the  founda- 
tion of  all  that  followed,  and  it  was  intended  to 
make  clear  to  the  world  that  America  would 
not  abandon  its  traditional  policy  for  imperial- 
istic adventure,  that  if  America  had  to  fight  it 
would  fight  for  the  peace  and  order  of  the  world. 
It  was  a  great  portent  in  human  history,  but  it 
was  overshadowed  at  the  time  by  the  opening  of 
the  presidential  campaign. 

Through  the  summer  the  President  insisted 
again  and  again  that  the  time  had  come  when 
America  must  assume  its  share  of  responsibility 
for  a  better  organization  of  mankind.  In  the 
early  autumn  very  startling  news  came  from 
Germany.  It  was  most  confusing  because  it 
promised  peace  manoeuvers,  hinted  at  a  separate 
arrangement  with  the  Russian  court  party,  and 
at  the  resumption  of  unlimited  submarine  war- 
fare. The  months  from  November  to  February 
were  to  tell  the  story.  Never  was  the  situation 
more  perplexing.  The  prestige  of  the  Allies  was 
at  low  ebb,  there  was  treachery  in  Russia,  and, 


In  April,  IQI7  85 

as  Mr.  Lansing  said,  America  was  on  the  verge 
of  war.  We  were  not  only  on  the  verge  of  war, 
but  on  the  verge  of  a  bewildering  war  which 
would  not  command  the  whole-hearted  support 
of  the  American  people. 

With  the  election  past,  and  a  continuity  of  ad- 
ministration assured,  it  became  President  Wil- 
son's task  to  make  some  bold  move  which  would 
clarify  the  muddle.  While  he  was  preparing 
this  move,  the  German  chancellor  made  his  high- 
handed proposal  for  a  blind  conference.  That  it 
would  be  rejected  was  obvious.  That  the  rejec- 
tion would  be  followed  by  the  submarine  war 
was  certain.  The  danger  was  that  America 
would  be  drawn  into  the  war  at  the  moment 
when  Germany  appeared  to  be  offering  the  peace 
for  which  the  bulk  of  the  American  people 
hoped.  We  know  now  that  the  peace  Germany 
was  prepared  to  make  last  December  was  the 
peace  of  a  conqueror;  but  at  the  time  Germany 
could  pose  as  a  nation  which  had  been  denied  a 
chance  to  end  the  war.  It  was  necessary,  there- 
fore, to  test  the  sincerity  of  Germany  by  asking 
publicly  for  a  statement  of  terms.  The  Presi- 
dent's circular  note  to  the  powers  was  issued. 


86  The  Political  Scene 

This  note  stated  more  precisely  than  ever  before 
that  America  was  ready  to  help  guarantee  the 
peace,  and  at  the  same  time  it  gave  all  the  bellig- 
erents a  chance  to  show  that  they  were  fighting 
for  terms  which  could  be  justified  to  American 
opinion.  The  note  was  very  much  misunder- 
stood at  first  because  the  President  had  said  that, 
since  both  sides  claimed  to  be  fighting  for  the 
same  things,  neither  could  well  refuse  to  define 
the  terms.  The  misunderstanding  soon  passed 
away  when  the  replies  came.  Germany  brushed 
the  President  aside,  and  showed  that  she  wanted 
a  peace  by  intrigue.  The  Allies  produced  a  docu- 
ment which  contained  a  number  of  formulae  so 
cleverly  worded  that  they  might  be  stretched  to 
cover  the  wildest  demands  of  the  extremists  or 
contracted  to  a  moderate  and  just  settlement. 
Above  all  the  Allies  assented  to  the  league  of 
peace  which  Germany  had  dismissed  as  irrele- 
vant. 

The  war  was  certain  to  go  on  with  America 
drawn  in.  On  January  22,  after  submarine  war- 
fare had  been  decided  upon  but  before  it  had 
been  proclaimed,  the  President  made  his  address 
to  the  Senate.    It  was  an  international  program 


In  April,  iqij  87 


for  democracy.    It  was  also  a  last  appeal  to  Ger- 
man liberals  to  avert  a  catastrophe.     They  did 
not  avert  it,  and  on  February  i   Germany  at-  / 
tacked  the  whole  neutral  world.     That  America   ; 
would  not  submit  was  assured.     The  question   \ 
that  remained  to  be  decided  was  the  extent  of 
our    participation    in    the    war.      Should    it   be 
merely  defensive  on  the  high  seas,  or  should  it 
be  a  separate  war?    The  real  source  of  confusion 
was  the  treacherous  and  despotic  Russian  Gov- 
ernment.   By  no  twist  of  language  could  a  part- 
nership with  that  Government  be  made  consist- 
ent with  the  principles  laid  down  by  the  Presi- 
dent in  his  address  to  the  Senate. 

The  Russian  revolution  ended  that  perplexity 
and  we  could  enter  the  war  with  a  clear  con- 
science and  a  whole  heart.    When  Russia  became  , 
a  republic  and  the  American  Republic  became  an  \ 
enemy,  the  German  Empire  was  isolated  before  i 
mankind  as  the  final  refuge  of  autocracy.     The  / 
principle  of  its  life  is  destructive  of  the  peace  of 
the  world.     How  destructive  that  principle  is 
the  ever-widening  circle  of  the  war  has  disclosed. 


88  The  Political  Scene 


11. 

Our  task  is  to  define  that  danger  so  that  our 
immense  sacrifices  shall  serve  to  end  it.  I  can 
not  do  that  for  myself  without  turning  to  the 
origins  of  the  war  in  order  to  trace  the  logical 
steps  by  which  the  pursuit  of  a  German  victory 
has  enlisted  the  enmity  of  the  world. 

We  read  statements  by  Germans  that  there 
was  a  conspiracy  against  their  national  develop- 
ment, that  they  found  themselves  encircled  by 
enemies,  that  Russia,  using  Serbia  as  an  instru- 
ment, was  trying  to  destroy  Austria,  and  that  the 
Entente  had  already  detached  Italy.  Supposing 
that  all  this  were  true,  it  would  remain  an  extraor- 
dinary thing  that  the  Entente  had  succeeded  in 
encircling  Germany.  Had  that  empire  been  a 
good  neighbor  in  Europe,  by  what  miracle  could 
the  old  hostility  between  England  and  France 
and  Russia  have  been  wiped  out  so  quickly  ?  But 
there  is  positive  evidence  that  no  such  conspiracy 
existed. 

Germany's  place  in  the  sun  is  Asia  Minor.  By 
the  Anglo-German  agreement  of  June,  19 14,  re- 
cently published,  a  satisfactory  arrangement  had 


In  April,  19 1 7  89 


been  reached  about  the  economic  exploitation  of 
the  Turkish  Empire.  Prof.  Rohrbach  has  ac- 
knowledged that  Germany  was  given  concessions 
"  which  exceeded  all  expectations,"  and  on  De- 
cember second,  19 14,  when  the  war  was  five 
months  old,  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  declared  in 
the  Reichstag  that  "this  understanding  was  to 
lessen  every  possible  political  friction."  The 
place  in  the  sun  had  been  secured  by  negotiation. 

But  the  road  to  that  place  lay  through  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  Balkans.  It  was  this  highway 
which  Germany  determined  to  control  absolutely 
and  the  chief  obstacle  on  that  highway  was 
Serbia  backed  by  Russia.  Into  the  complexities 
of  that  Balkan  intrigue  I  am  not  competent  to 
enter.  We  need,  however,  do  no  more  than  fol- 
low Lord  Grey  in  the  belief  that  Austria  had  a 
genuine  grievance  against  Serbia,  a  far  greater 
one,  certainly,  than  the  United  States  has  ever 
had  against  Mexico.  But  Britain  had  no  stake 
in  the  Austro-Serbian  quarrel  itself. 

It  had  an  interest  in  the  method  which  the 
Central  Powers  took  of  settling  the  quarrel. 
When  Germany  declared  that  Europe  could  not 
be  consulted,  that  Austria  must  be  allowed  to 


go  The  Political  Scene 

crush  Serbia  without  reference  to  the  concert 
of  Europe,  Germany  proclaimed  herself  an  en- 
emy of  international  order.  She  preferred  a  war 
which  involved  all  of  Europe  to  any  admission 
of  the  fact  that  a  cooperative  Europe  existed. 
It  was  an  assertion  of  unlimited  national  sover- 
eignty which  Europe  could  not  tolerate. 

This  brought  Russia  and  France  into  the  field. 
Instantly  Germany  acted  on  the  same  doctrine 
of  unlimited  national,  sovereignty  by  striking  at 
France  through  Belgium.  Had  Belgium  been 
merely  a  small  neutral  nation  the  crime  would 
still  have  been  one  of  the  worst  in  the  history 
of  the  modern  world.  The  fact  that  Belgium 
was  an  internationalized  State  has  made  the  in- 
vasion the  master  tragedy  of  the  war.  For  Bel- 
gium represented  what  progress  the  world  had 
made  toward  cooperation.  If  it  could  not  sur- 
vive then  no  internationalism  was  possible. 
That  is  why  through  these  years  of  horror  upon 
horror  the  Belgian  horror  is  the  fiercest  of  all. 
The  burning,  the  shooting,  the  starving,  and  the 
robbing  of  small  and  inoffensive  nations  is  tragic 
enough.  But  the  German  crime  in  Belgium  is 
greater  than  the  sum  of  Belgium^s  misery.     It 


In  April,  igij  91 


is  a  crime  against  the  bases  of  faith  on  which  the" 
world  must  build  or  perish. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  instantly  brought  the 
five  British  democracies  into  the  war.  I  think 
this  is  the  accurate  way  to  state  the  fact.  Had 
the  war  remained  a  Balkan  war  with  France  en- 
gaged merely  because  of  her  treaty  with  Russia, 
had  the  fighting  been  confined  to  the  Franco- 
German  frontier,  the  British  Empire  might  have 
come  into  the  war  to  save  the  balance  of 
power  and  to  fulfil  the  naval  agreements  with 
France,  but  the  conflict  would  probably  never 
have  become  a  people's  war  in  all  the  free  nations 
of  the  Empire.  Whatever  justice  there  may  have 
been  in  Austria's  original  quarrel  with  Serbia 
and  Russia  was  overwhelmed  by  the  exhibition 
of  national  lawlessness  in  Belgium. 

This  led  to  the  third  great  phase  of  the  war,  the 
phase  which  concerned  America  most  immedi- 
ately. The  Allies,  directed  by  Great  Britain,  em- 
ployed sea  power  to  the  utmost.  They  barred 
every  road  to  Germany,  and  undoubtedly  vio- 
lated many  commercial  rights  of  neutrals.  What 
America  would  do  about  this  became  of  decisive 
importance.     If  it  chose  to  uphold  the  rights  it 


92  The  Political  Scene 

claimed,  it  would  aid  Germany  and  cripple  the 
Allies.  If  it  refused  to  do  more  than  negotiate 
with  the  Allies,  it  had,  whatever  the  technicali- 
ties of  the  case  might  be,  thrown  its  great  weight 
against  Germany.  It  had  earned  the  enmity  of 
the  German  Government,  an  enmity  which  broke 
out  into  intrigue  and  conspiracy  on  American 
soil.  Somewhere  in  the  winter  of  19 15  America 
was  forced  to  choose  between  a  policy  which 
helped  Germany  and  one  which  helped  the  Allies. 
We  were  confronted  with  a  situation  in  which 
we  had  to  choose  between  opening  a  road  to 
Germany  and  making  an  enemy  of  Germany. 
With  the  proclamation  of  submarine  warfare  in 
191 5  we  were  told  that  either  we  must  aid  Ger- 
many by  crippling  sea  power  or  be  treated  as  a 
hostile  nation.  The  German  policy  was  very 
simple:  British  mastery  of  the  seas  must  be 
broken.  It  could  be  broken  by  an  American  at- 
tack from  the  rear  or  by  the  German  submarine. 
If  America  refused  to  attack  from  the  rear, 
America  was  to  be  counted  as  an  enemy.  It  was 
a  case  of  he  who  is  not  for  me  is  against  me. 

To  such  an  alternative  there  was  but  one  an- 
swer for  a  free  people  to  make.    To  become  the 


In  April,  igij  93 

ally  of  the  conqueror  of  Belgium  against  France 
and  the  British  democracies  was  utterly  out  of 
the  question.  Our  choice  was  made  and  the  su- 
preme question  of  American  policy  became :  How 
far  will  Germany  carry  the  war  against  us  and 
how  hard  shall  we  strike  back?  That  we  were 
aligned  on  the  side  of  Germany's  enemies  no 
candid  man,  I  think,  can  deny.  The  effect  of 
this  alignment  was  to  make  sea  power  absolute. 
For  mastery  of  the  seas  is  no  longer  the  posses- 
sion of  any  one  nation.  The  supremacy  of  the 
British  Navy  in  this  war  rests  on  international 
consent,  on  the  consent  of  her  allies  and  of  the 
neutrals.  Without  that  consent  the  blockade  of 
Germany  could  not  exist,  and  the  decision  of 
America  not  to  resist  Allied  sea  power  was  the 
final  blow  which  cut  off  Germany  from  the 
world.  It  happened  gradually,  without  spectac- 
ular announcement,  but  history,  I  think,  will 
call  it  one  of  the  decisive  events  of  the 
war. 

The  effect  was  to  deny  Germany  access  to  the 
resources  of  the  neutral  world,  and  to  open  these 
resources  to  the  Allies.  Poetic  justice  never  de- 
vised a  more  perfect  retribution.     The  nation 


94  The  Political  Scene 

which  had  struck  down  a  neutral  to  gain  a  mili- 
tary advantage  found  the  neutral  world  a  part- 
ner of  its  enemies. 

That  partnership  between  the  neutral  world 
and  Germany's  enemies  rested  on  merchant  ship- 
ping. This  suggested  a  new  theory  of  warfare 
to  the  German  Government.  It  decided  that 
since  every  ship  afloat  fed  the  resources  of  its 
enemies,  it  might  be  a  good  idea  to  sink  every 
ship  afloat.  It  decided  that  since  all  the  high- 
ways of  the  world  were  the  communications  of 
the  Allies,  those  communications  should  be  cut. 
It  decided  that  if  enough  ships  were  destroyed, 
it  didn't  matter  what  ships  or  whose  ships,  Eng- 
land and  France  would  have  to  surrender  and 
make  a  peace  on  the  basis  of  Germany's  victories 
in  Europe. 

Therefore  on  the  thirty-first  of  January,  19 17, 
Germany  abolished  neutrality  in  the  world.  The 
policy  which  began  by  denying  that  a  quarrel 
in  the  Balkans  could  be  referred  to  Europe,  went 
on  to  destroy  the  internationalized  State  of  Bel- 
gium, culminated  in  indiscriminate  attack  upon 
the  merchant  shipping  of  all  nations.  The  doc- 
trine   of    exclusive    nationalism    had     moved 


In  April,  IQIJ  95 


through  these  three  dramatic  phases  until  those 
who  held  it  were  at  war  with  mankind. 

III. 

The  terrible  logic  of  Germany's  policy  had  a 
stupendous  result.  By  striking  at  the  bases  of 
all  international  order,  Germany  convinced  even 
the  most  isolated  of  neutrals  that  order  must  be 
preserved  by  common  effort.  By  denying  that  a 
society  of  nations  exists,  a  society  of  nations  has 
been  forced  into  existence.  The  very  thing  Ger- 
many challenged  Germany  has  established.  Be- 
fore 1914  only  a  handful  of  visionaries  dared  to 
hope  for  some  kind  of  federation.  The  ortho- 
dox view  was  that  each  nation  had  a  destiny  of 
its  own,  spheres  of  influence  of  its  own,  and  that 
it  was  somehow  beneath  the  dignity  of  a  great 
State  to  discuss  its  so-called  vital  interests  with 
other  governments.  It  was  a  world  almost  with- 
out common  aspiration,  with  few  effective  com- 
mon ideals.  Europe  was  split  into  shifting 
alliances,  democracies  and  autocracies  jumbled 
together.  America  lay  apart  with  a  budding  im- 
perialism of  its  own.  China  was  marked  as  the 
helpless  victim  of  exploitation.     That  old  politi- 


96  The  Political  Scene 

cal  system  was  one  in  which  the  German  view 
was  by  no  means  altogether  disreputable.  In- 
ternationalism was  half-hearted  and  generally 
regarded  somewhat  cynically. 

What  Germany  did  was  to  demonstrate  ad 
nauseam  the  doctrine  of  competitive  nationalism. 
Other  nations  had  applied  it  here  and  there,  cau- 
tiously and  timidly.  No  other  nation  in  our  time 
had  ever  applied  it  with  absolute  logic,  with 
absolute  preparation,  and  with  absolute  disre- 
gard of  the  consequences.  Other  nations  had 
dallied  with  it,  compromised  about  it,  muddled 
along  with  it.  But  Germany  followed  through, 
and  Germany  taught  the  world  just  where  the 
doctrine  leads. 

Out  of  the  necessities  of  defense  against  it 
men  have  gradually  formulated  the  ideals  of  a 
cooperative  nationalism.  From  all  parts  of  the 
world  there  has  been  a  movement  of  ideals  work- 
ing slowly  toward  one  end,  toward  a  higher 
degree  of  spiritual  unanimity  than  has  ever  been 
known  before.  China  and  India  have  been 
stirred  out  of  their  dependence.  The  American 
Republic  has  abandoned  its  isolation.  Russia 
has  become  something  like  a  republic.    The  Brit- 


In  A*>ril,  igij  97 


ish  Empire  is  movinr,  toward  closer  federation. 
The  grand  alliance  railed  into  existence  by  the 
German  aggression  -s  now  something  more  than 
a  military  coalition.*  Common  ideals  are  work- 
ing through  it — id  ^^.Is  of  local  autonomy  and 
joint  action.  Men  're  crying  that  they  must  be 
free  and  that  they  ii'ust  be  united.  They  have 
learned  that  they  can  not  be  free  unless  they  co- 
operate,  that  they  ca  \  not  cooperate  unless  they 
are  free.  /^ 

I  do  not  wish  to, ^underestimate  the  forces  of 
reaction  in  our  country  or  in  the  other  nations 
of  the  alliance.  There  are  politicians  and  com- 
mercial groups  who  see  in  this  whole  thing  ^ 
nothing  but  opportunity  to  secure  concessions, 
manipulate  tariffs,  and  extend  the  bureaucracies. 
We  shall  know  how  to  deal  with  them.  Forces 
have  been  let  loose  which  they  can  no  longer 
control,  and  out  of  this  immense  horror  ideas 
have  arisen  to  possess  men's  souls.  There  are 
times  when  a  prudent  statesman  must  build  on 
a  contracted  view  of  human  nature.  But  there 
are  times  when  new  sources  of  energy  are 
tapped,  when  the  impossible  becomes  possible, 
when  events  outrun  our  calculations.    This  may 


98  The  Political  Scene 

y 

be  such  a  time.  The  allianc'^^  to  which  we  belong 
has  suddenly  grown  hot  wit^  the  new  democracy 
of  Russia  and  the  new  internjitionalism  of  Amer- 
ica. It  has  had  an  access  of  spiritual  force 
which  opens  a  i^ew  prospect  h^  the  policies  of  the 
world.  We  can  dare  to  hog,^  for  things  which 
we  never  dared  to  hope  for.iti  the  past.  In  fact 
if  those  forces  are  not  to  gr^^w  cold  and  frittered 
they  must  be  turned  to  a  gUat  end  and  offered 
a  great  hope.  A 

IV. 

That  great  end  and  that  great  hope  is  nothing 
less  than  the  federation  of  the  world.  I  know 
it  sounds  a  little  old-fashioned  to  use  that  phrase 
because  we  have  abused  it  so  long  in  empty  rhet- 
oric; but  no  other  idea  is  big  enough  to  describe 
the  alliance.  It  is  no  longer  an  offensive-defen- 
sive military  agreement  among  diplomats.  That 
is  how  it  started,  to  be  sure;  but  it  has  grown 
and  is  growing  into  a  union  of  peoples  deter- 
mined to  end  forever  that  intriguing,  adventur- 
ous nationalism  which  has  torn  the  world  for 
three  centuries.  Good  democrats  have  always 
believed  that  the  common  interests  of  men  were 


In  April,  ig  17  99 

greater  than  their  special  interests,  that  ruling 
classes  can  be  enemies,  but  that  the  nations  must 
be  partners.  Well,  this  war  is  being  fought  by- 
nations.  It  is  the  nations  who  were  called  to 
arms,  and  it  is  the  force  of  nations  that  is  now 
stirring  the  world  to  its  foundations. 

The  war  is  dissolving  into  a  stupendous  rev- 
olution. A  few  months  ago  we  still  argued 
about  the  Bagdad  corridor,  strategic  frontiers, 
colonies.  Those  were  the  stakes  of  the  diplo- 
mat's war.  The  whole  perspective  is  changed 
to-day  by  the  revolution  in  Russia  and  the  in- 
tervention of  America.  The  scale  of  values  is 
transformed,  for  the  democracies  are  unloosed. 
Those  democracies  have  nothing  to  gain  and 
everything  to  lose  by  the  old  competitive  nation- 
alism, the  old  apparatus  of  diplomacy,  with  its 
criminal  rivalries  in  the  backward  places  of  the 
earth.  The  democracies,  if  they  are  to  be  safe, 
must  cooperate.  For  the  old  rivalries  mean  fric- 
tion and  armament  and  a  distortion  of  all  the 
hopes  of  free  government.  They  mean  that  na- 
tions are  organized  to  exploit  each  other  and  to 
exploit  themselves.  That  is  the  life  of  what  we 
call  autocracy.    It  establishes  its  power  at  home 


lOO  The  Political  Scene 

by  pointing  to  enemies  abroad.  It  fights  its 
enemies  abroad  by  dragooning  the  population  at 
home. 

That  is  why  practically  the  whole  world  is  at 
war  with  the  greatest  of  the  autocracies.  That 
is  why  the  whole  world  is  turning  so  passionately 
toward  democracy  as  the  only  principle  on  which 
peace  can  be  secured.  Many  have  feared,  I 
know,  that  the  war  against  Prussian  militarism 
would  result  the  other  way,  that  instead  of  lib- 
eralizing Prussia  the  outcome  would  be  a  Prus- 
sianization  of  the  democracies.  That  would  be 
the  outcome  if  Prusso-Germany  won.  That 
would  be  the  result  of  a  German  victory.  And 
that  is  why  we,  who  are  the  most  peaceful  of 
democracies,  are  at  war.  The  success  of  the  sub- 
marine would  give  Germany  victory.  It  was  and 
is  her  one  great  chance.  To  have  stood  aside 
when  Germany  made  this  terrible  bid  for  victory 
would  have  been  to  betray  the  hope  of  free  gov- 
ernment and  international  union. 


There  are  two  ways  now  in  which  peace  can 
be  made.    The  first  is  by  political  revolution  in 


In  April,  1917  loi 

Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  It  is  not  for/ 
us  to  define  the  nature  of  that  revolution.  We 
can  not  dictate  liberty  to  the  German  people.  It 
is  for  them  to  decide  what  political  institutions 
they  will  adopt,  but  if  peace  is  to  come  through 
revolution,  we  shall  know  that  it  has  come  when 
new  voices  are  heard  in  Germany,  new  policies 
are  proclaimed,  when  there  is  good  evidence  that 
there  has,  indeed,  been  a  new  orientation.  If 
that  is  done,  the  war  can  be  ended  by  negotia- 
tion. 

The  other  path  to  peace  is  by  the  definite  de-  / 
feat  of  every  item  in  the  program  of  aggression.  ( 
This  will  mean,  at  a  minimum,  a  demonstration  \ 
on  the  field  that  the  German  army  is  not  invin- 
cible; a  renunciation  by  Germany  of  all  the  ter-  , 
ritory  she  has  conquered ;  a  special  compensation  ^ 
to  Belgium;  and  an  acknowledgment  of  the  fal-  I 
lacy  of  exclusive  nationalism  by  an  application 
for  membership  in  the  league  of  nations.  ) 

Frontier  questions,  colonial  questions,  are  now  1 
entirely  secondary,   and  beyond   this  minimum  ( 
program  the  United  States  has  no  direct  interest  • 
in  the  territorial  settlement.     The  objects   for 
which  we  are  at  war  will  be  attained  if  we  can 


102  The  Political  Scene 

defeat  absolutely  the  foreign  policy  of  the  pres- 
ent German  Government.     For  a  ruling  caste 
which  has  been  humiliated  abroad  has  lost  its 
glamour  at  home.     So  we  are  at  war  to  defeat 
the  German  Government  in  the  outer  world,  to 
/  destroy  its  prestige,  to  deny  its  conquests,  and  to 
/  throw  it  back  at  last  into  the  arms  of  the  Ger- 
l  man  people  marked  and  discredited  as  the  author 
'  of  their  miseries.     It  is  for  them  to  make  the 
final  settlement  with  it.  s 

If  it  is  our  privilege  to  exert  the  power  which 
turns  the  scale,  it  is  our  duty  to  see  that  the  end 
justifies  the  means.  We  can  win  nothing  from 
this  war  unless  it  culminates  in  a  union  of  liberal 
peoples  pledged  to  cooperate  in  the  settlement  of 
all  outstanding  questions,  sworn  to  turn  against 
the  aggressor,  determined  to  erect  a  larger  and 
more  modern  system  of  international  law  upon 
a  federation  of  the  world.  That  is  what  we  are 
fighting  for,  at  this  moment,  on  the  ocean,  in  the 
shipyard,  and  in  the  factory;  later  perhaps  in 
France  and  Belgium,  ultimately  at  the  council 
\  of  peace. 

If  we  are  strong  enough  and  wise  enough  to 
win  this  victory,  to  reject  all  the  poison  of  hatred 


In  April,  igij  103 


abroad  and  intolerance  at  home,  we  shall  have 
made  a  nation  to  which  free  men  will  turn  with 
love  and  gratitude.  For  ourselves  we  shall  stand 
committed  as  never  before  to  the  realization  of 
democracy  in  America.  We  who  have  gone  to 
war  to  insure  democracy  in  the  world  will  have 
raised  an  aspiration  here  that  will  not  end  with 
the  overthrow  of  the  Prussian  autocracy.  We 
shall  turn  with  fresh  interests  to  our  own  tyran- 
nies— to  our  Colorado  mines,  our  autocratic 
steel  industries,  our  sweatshops,  and  our  slums. 
We  shall  call  that  man  un-American  and  no  pa- 
triot who  prates  of  liberty  in  Europe  and  resists 
it  at  home.  A  force  is  loose  in  America  as  well. 
Our  own  reactionaries  will  not  assuage  it  with 
their  Billy  Sundays  or  control  it  through  lawyers 
and  politicians  of  the  old  guard. 


APPENDIX  II 

TEXT    OF    THE    PROPOSED    CONSTITU- 
TION OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS ' 

COVENANT 

Preamble 
In  order  to  promote  international  cooperation 
and  to  secure  international  peace  and  security  by 
the  acceptance  of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war, 
by  the  prescription  of  open,  just  and  honorable 
relations  between  nations,  by  the  'firm  establish- 
ment of  the  understandings  of  international  law 
as  the  actual  rule  of  conduct  among  governments, 
and  by  the  maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupu- 
lous respect  for  all  treaty  obligations  in  the  deal- 
^ings  of  organised  people  with  one  another,  the 
powers  signatory  to  this  covenant  adopt  this  con- 
stitution of  the  League  of  Nations: 

Article  I. 
The  action  of   the  high   contracting  parties 
under  the  terms  of  this  covenant  shall  be  effected 

^  Reprinted  from  pamphlet  published  by  League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
130  West  42d  Street,  New  York. 

104 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations   105 

through  the  instrumentality  of  meetings  of  a 
body  of  delegates  representing  the  high  contract- 
ing parties,  of  meetings  at  more  frequent  in- 
tervals of  an  Executive  Council,  and  of  a 
permanent  international  secretariat  to  be  estab- 
lished at  the  seat  of  the  League. 

Article  II. 

Meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates  shall  be 
held  at  stated  intervals  and  from  time  to  time, 
as  occasion  may  require,  for  the  purpose  of  deal- 
ing with  matters  within  the  sphere  of  action  of 
the  League.  Meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates 
shall  be  held  at  the  seat  of  the  League,  or  at  such 
other  places  as  may  be  found  convenient,  and 
shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties.  Each  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  shall  have  one  vote,  but  may  have  not 
more  than  three  representatives. 

Article  III. 

The  Executive  Council  shall  consist  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  States  of  America,  the 
British  Empire,   France,  Italy,  and  Japan,   to- 


lo6  Appendix 


gether  with  representatives  of  four  other  States, 
members  of  the  League.  The  selection  of  these 
four  States  shall  be  made  by  the  body  of  dele- 
gates on  such  principles  and  in  such  manner  as 
they  think  fit.  Pending  the  appointment  of  these 
representatives  of  the  other  States,  representa- 
tives of shall  be  members  of  the  Execu- 
tive Council. 

Meetings  of  the  council  shall  be  held  from 
time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require,  and  at  least 
once  a  year,  at  v^hatever  place  may  be  decided 
on,  or,  failing  any  such  decision,  at  the  seat  of 
the  League,  and  any  matter  within  the  sphere  of 
action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the 
world  may  be  dealt  with  at  such  meetings. 

Invitations  shall  be  sent  to  any  power  to  attend 
a  meeting  of  the  council,  at  which  matters 
directly  affecting  its  interests  are  to  be  dis- 
cussed, and  no  decision  taken  at  any  meeting 
will  be  binding  on  such  a  power  unless  so  invited. 

Article  IV. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the 
body  of  delegates  or  the  Executive  Council,  in- 
cluding the  appointment  of  committees  to  inves- 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations    107 

tigate  particular  matters,  shall  be  regulated  by 
the  body  of  delegates  or  the  Executive  Council, 
and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  States 
represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  body  of  delegates  and 
of  the  Executive  Council  shall  be  summoned  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Article  V. 

The  permanent  secretariat  of  the  League  shall 

be  established  at  ,  v^hich  shall  constitute 

the  seat  of  the  League.  The  secretariat  shall 
comprise  such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be 
required,  under  the  general  direction  and  control 
of  a  Secretary  General  of  the  League,  who  shall 
be  chosen  by  the  Executive  Council.  The  secre- 
tariat shall  be  appointed  by  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Executive 
Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall  act  in  that  capac- 
ity at  all  meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates  or 
of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  secretariat  shall  be  borne 
by  the  States  members  of  the  League,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  apportionment  of  the  expenses  of 


Io8  Appendix 


the  International  Bureau  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union. 

Article  VI. 

Representatives  of  the  high  contracting  parties 
and  officials  of  the  League,  when  engaged  in  the 
business  of  the  League,  shall  enjoy  diplomatic 
privileges  and  immunities,  and  the  buildings  oc- 
cupied by  the  League  or  its  officials,  or  by  repre- 
sentatives attending  its  meetings,  shall  enjoy  the 
benefits  of  extra-territoriality. 

Article  VII. 

Admission  to  the  League  of  States,  not  signa- 
tories to  the  covenant  and  not  named  in  the  pro- 
tocol hereto  as  States  to  be  invited  to  adhere  to 
the  covenant,  requires  the  assent  of  not  less  than 
two-thirds  of  the  States  represented  in  the  body 
of  delegates,  and  shall  be  limited  to  fully  self- 
governing  countries,  including  dominions  and 
colonies. 

No  State  shall  be  admitted  to  the  League  un- 
less it  is  able  to  give  effective  guarantees  of  its 
sincere  intention  to  observe  its  international  ob- 
ligations and  unless  it  shall  conform  to  such 
principles  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  League 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations     109 

in  regard  to  its  naval  and  military  forces  and 
armaments. 

Article  VIII. 

The  high  contracting  parties  recognize  the 
principle  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  will  re- 
quire the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the 
lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety,  and 
the  enforcement  by  common  action  of  interna- 
tional obligations,  having  special  regard  to  the 
geographical  situation  and  circumstances  of  each 
State,  and  the  Executive  Council  shall  formulate 
plans  for  effecting  such  reduction.  The  Exe- 
cutive Council  shall  also  determine  for  the  con- 
sideration and  action  of  the  several  Governments 
what  military  equipment  and  armament  is  fair 
and  reasonable  in  proportion  to  the  scale  of 
forces  laid  down  in  the  program  of  disarma- 
ment; and  these  limits,  when  adopted,  shall  not 
be  exceeded  without  the  permission  of  the  Exe- 
cutive Council. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  the 
manufacture  by  private  enterprise  of  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  lends  itself  to  grave  ob- 
jections, and  direct  the  Executive  Council  to  ad- 


no  Appendix 


vise  how  the  evil  effects  attendant  upon  such 
manufacture  can  be  prevented,  due  regard  being 
had  to  the  necessities  of  those  countries  which 
are  not  able  to  manufacture  for  themselves  the 
munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary  for 
their  safety. 

The  high  contracting  parties  undertake  in  no 
way  to  conceal  from  each  other  the  condition  of 
such  of  their  industries  as  are  capable  of  being 
adapted  to  warlike  purposes  or  the  scale  of  their 
armaments,  and  agree  that  there  shall  be  full 
and  frank  interchange  of  information  as  to  their 
military  and  naval  programs. 

Article  IX. 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted 
to  advise  the  League  on  the  execution  of  the 
provisions  of  Article  VIII.  and  on  military  and 
naval  questions  generally. 

Article  X. 

The  high  contracting  parties  shall  undertake 
to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  external  ag- 
gression the  territorial  integrity  and  existing 
political  independence  of  all  States  members  of 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations     ill 

the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or 
in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggres- 
sion the  Executive  Council  shall  advise  upon  the 
means  by  v^hich  the  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

Article  XI. 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immedi- 
ately affecting  any  of  the  high  contracting  par- 
ties or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern 
to  the  League,  and  the  high  contracting  parties 
reserve  the  right  to  take  any  action  that  may  be 
deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace 
of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be 
the  friendly  right  of  each  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  body  of  dele- 
gates or  of  the  Executive  Council  to  any  cir- 
cumstance affecting  international  intercourse 
which  threatens  to  disturb  international  peace  or 
the  good  understanding  between  nations  upon 
which  peace  depends. 

Article  XII. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  should 
disputes  arise  between  them  which  cannot  be  ad- 


112  Appendix 


justed  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy 
they  will  in  no  case  resort  to  war  without  pre- 
viously submitting  the  questions  and  matters  in- 
volved either  to  arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the 
Executive  Council  and  until  three  months  after 
the  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a  recommenda- 
tion by  the  Executive  Council,  and  that  they  will 
not  even  then  resort  to  war  as  against  a  member 
of  the  League  which  complies  with  the  award  of 
the  arbitrators  or  the  recommendation  of  the 
Executive  Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  article  the  award  of  the 
arbitrators  shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable 
time,  and  the  recommendation  of  the  Executive 
Council  shall  be  made  within  six  months  after 
the  submission  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XIII. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  when- 
ever any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise  between 
them,  which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for 
submission  to  arbitration  and  which  cannot  be 
satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will  sub- 
mit the  whole  matter  to  arbitration.  For  this 
purpose  the  court  of  arbitration  to  which  the 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations  113 

case  is  referred  shall  be  the  court  agreed  on  by 
the  parties  or  stipulated  in  any  convention  ex- 
isting between  them.  The  high  contracting 
parties  agree  that  they  will  carry  out  in  full  good 
faith  any  award  that  may  be  rendered.  In  the 
event  of  any  failure  to  carry  out  the  award  the 
Executive  Council  shall  propose  what  steps  can 
best  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  XIV. 

The  Executive  Council  shall  formulate  plans 
for  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  court  of 
international  justice,  and  this  court  shall,  when 
established,  be  competent  to  hear  and  determine 
any  matter  which  the  parties  recognize  as  suit- 
able for  submission  to  it  for  arbitration  under 
the  foregoing  article. 

Article  XV. 

If  there  should  arise  between  States,  members 
of  the  League,  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rup- 
ture, which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as 
above,  the  high  contracting  parties  agree  that 
they  will   refer   the   matter   to   the    Executive 


114  Appendix 


Council;  either  party  to  the  dispute  may  give 
notice  of  the  existence  of  the  dispute  to  the  Sec- 
retary General,  who  will  make  all  necessary 
arrangements  for  a  full  investigation  and  consid- 
eration thereof.  For  this  purpose  the  parties 
agree  to  communicate  to  the  Secretary  General, 
as  promptly  as  possible,  statements  of  their  case, 
with  all  the  relevant  facts  and  papers,  and  the 
Executive  Council  may  forthwith  direct  the  pub- 
lication thereof. 

Where  the  efforts  of  the  council  lead  to  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute,  a  statement  shall  be 
published,  indicating  the  nature  of  the  dispute 
and  the  terms  of  settlement,  together  with  such 
explanations  as  may  be  appropriate.  If  the  dis- 
pute has  not  been  settled,  a  report  by  the  council 
shall  be  published,  setting  forth  with  all  neces- 
sary facts  and  explanations  the  recommendation 
which  the  council  think  just  and  proper  for  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute.  If  the  report  is 
unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members  of  the 
council,  other  than  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the 
high  contracting  parties  agree  that  they  will  not 
go  to  war  with  any  party  which  complies  with 
!he  recommendations,  and  that,  if  any  party  shall 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations  ii^ 

refuse  so  to  comply,  the  council  shall  propose 
measures  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the  recom- 
mendations. If  no  such  unanimous  report  can  be 
made  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  majority  and  the 
privilege  of  the  minority  to  issue  statements,  in- 
dicating virhat  they  believe  to  be  the  facts,  and 
containing  the  recommendations  v^hich  they  con- 
sider to  be  just  and  proper. 

The  Executive  Council  may  in  any  case  under 
this  article  refer  the  dispute  to  the  body  of  dele- 
gates. The  dispute  shall  be  so  referred  at  the 
request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  provided 
that  such  request  must  be  made  within  fourteen 
days  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute.  In 
any  case  referred  to  the  body  of  delegates,  all 
the  provisions  of  this  article,  and  of  Article 
XIL,  relating  to  the  action  and  powers  of  the 
Executive  Council,  shall  apply  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  body  of  delegates. 

IArticle  XVI. 

Should  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties 
break  or  disregard  its  covenants  under  Article 
XII.  it  shall  thereby  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have 
(committed  m  act  of  war  against  all  the  Other 


Il6  Appendix 


members  of  the  League,  which  hereby  under- 
takes immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  severance 
of  all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition 
of  all  intercourse  between  their  nationals  and 
the  nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and 
the  prevention  of  all  financial,  commercial,  or 
personal  intercourse  between  the  nationals  of  the 
covenant-breaking  State  and  the  nationals  of  any 
other  State,  whether  a  member  of  the  League  or 
not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  Council 
in  such  case  to  recommend  what  effective  mili- 
tary or  naval  force  the  members  of  the  League 
shall  severally  contribute  to  the  armed  forces  to 
be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree,  further, 
that  they  will  mutually  support  one  another  in 
the  financial  and  economic  measures  which  may 
be  taken  under  this  article  in  order  to  minimize 
the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting  from  the 
above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually  sup- 
port one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures 
aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant- 
breaking  State  and  that  they  will  afford  pas- 
sage through  their  territory  to  the  forces  of  any 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations  i\J 

of  the  high  contracting  parties  who  are  coopera- 
ting to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

Article  XVII. 

In  the  event  of  disputes  between  one  State 
member  of  the  League  and  another  State  which 
is  not  a  member  of  the  League,  or  between  States 
not  members  of  the  League,  the  high  contracting 
parties  agree  that  the  State  or  States,  not  mem- 
bers of  the  League,  shall  be  invited  to  accept  the 
obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for  the 
purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon  such  conditions  as 
the  Executive  Council  may  deem  just,  and  upon 
acceptance  of  any  such  invitation,  the  above  pro- 
visions shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications 
as  may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  League. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given,  the  Execu- 
tive Council  shall  immediately  institute  an  in- 
quiry into  the  circumstances  and  merits  of  the 
dispute  and  recommend  such  action  as  may  seem 
best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

In  the  event  of  a  power  so  invited  refusing  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the 
League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  and 
taking  any  action  against  a  State  member  of  the 


Ii8  Appendix 


League,  which  in  the  case  of  a  State  member  of 
the  League  would  constitute  a  breach  of  Arti- 
cle XIL,  the  provisions  of  Article  XVL  shall  be 
applicable  as  against  the  State  taking  such  action. 
If  both  parties  to  the  dispute,  when  so  invited, 
refuse  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership 
in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute, 
the  Executive  Council  may  take  such  action  and 
make  such  recommendations  as  will  prevent  hos- 
tilities and  will  result  in  the  setdement  of  the 
dispute. 

Article  XVIIL 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  the 
League  shall  be  intrusted  with  the  general  super- 
vision of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition 
with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  of  this 
traffic  is  necessary  in  the  common  interest. 

Article  XIX. 

To  those  colonies  and  territ6ries  which,  as  a 
consequence  of  the  late  war,  have  ceased  to  be 
under  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  which  for- 
merly governed  them  and  which  are  inhabited  by 
peoples  not  yet  able  to  §t?ind  by  themselves  un- 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations  119 

der  the  strenuous  conditions  of  the  modern 
world,  there  should  be  applied  the  principle  that 
the  well-being  and  development  of  such  peoples 
'form  a  sacred  trust  of  civilization  and  that  se- 
curities for  the  performance  of  this  trust  should 
be  embodied  in  the  constitution  of  the  League. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to 
this  principle  is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples 
should  be  intrusted  to  advanced  nations,  who  by- 
reason  of  their  resources,  their  experience,  or 
their  geographical  position,  can  best  undertake 
this  responsibility,  and  that  this  tutelage  should 
be  exercised  by  them  as  mandatories  on  behalf  of 
the  League. 

[The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  ac- 
cording to  the  stage  of  the  development  of  the 
people,  the  geographical  situation  of  the  terri- 
tory, its  economic  conditions  and  other  similar 
circumstances. 

Certain  communities,  formerly  belonging  to 
the  Turkish  Empire,  have  reached  a  stage  of 
development  where  their  existence  as  independ- 
ent nations  can  be  provisionally  recognized,  sub- 
ject to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice 
and  assistance  by  a  mandatory  power  until  such 


I20  Appendix 


time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes 
of  these  communities  must  be  a  principal  con- 
sideration in  the  selection  of  the  mandatory 
power. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central 
Africa,  are. at  such  a  stage  that  the  mandatory 
must  be  responsible  for  the  administration  of  the 
territory,  subject  to  conditions  which  will  guar- 
antee freedom  of  conscience  or  religion,  subject 
only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and 
morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the 
slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic,  and  the  liquor  traf- 
fic, and  the  prevention  of  the  establishment  of 
fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of 
military  training  of  the  natives  for  other  than 
police  purposes  and  the  defense, of  territory,  and 
will  also  secure  equal  opportunities  for  the  trade 
and  commerce  of  other  members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  Southwest  Africa 
and  certain  of  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which, 
owing  to  the  sparseness  of  the  population,  or 
their  small  size,  or  their  remoteness  from  the 
centers  of  civilization,  or  their  geographical  con- 
tiguity to  the  mandatory  State  and  other  cir- 
cumstances, can  be  best  administered  under  the 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations     121 

laws  of  the  mandatory  States  as  integral  por- 
tions thereof,  subject  to  the  safeguards  above 
mentioned  in  the  interests  of  the  indigenous 
population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  mandatory  State 
shall  render  to  the  League  an  annual  report  in 
reference  to  the  territory  committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  adminis- 
tration, to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatory  State, 
shall,  if  not  previously  agreed  upon  by  the  high 
contracting  parties  in  each  case,  be  explicitly  de- 
fined by  the  Executive  Council  in  a  special  act 
or  charter. 

The  high  contracting  parties  further  agree  to 
establish  at  the  seat  of  the  League  a  mandatory 
commission  to  receive  and  examine  the  annual 
reports  of  the  mandatory  powers,  and  to  assist 
the  League  in  insuring  the  observance  of  the 
terms  of  all  mandates. 

r 

Article  XX. 

The  high  contracting  parties  will  endeavor  to 
secure  and  maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions 
of  labor  for  men,  women,  and  children,  both  in 
their  own  countries  and  in  all  countries  to  which 


122  Appendix 


their  commercial  and  industrial  relations  extend; 
and  to  that  end  agree  to  establish  as  part  of  the 
organization  of  the  League  a  permanent  bureau 
of  labor. 

Article  XXI. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  pro- 
vision shall  be  made  through  the  instrumentality 
of  the  League  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom 
of  transit  and  equitable  treatment  for  the  com- 
merce of  all  States  members  of  the  League,  hav- 
ing in  mind,  among  other  things,  special  arrange- 
ments with  regard  to  the  necessities  cf  the 
regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  191 4- 191 8. 

Article  XXIL 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  to  place 
under  the  control  of  the  League  all  international 
bureaus  already  established  by  general  treaties, 
if  the  parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  Further- 
more, they  agree  that  all  such  international  bu- 
reaus to  be  constituted  in  future  shall  be  placed 
under  control  of  the  League. 


The  Proposed  League  of  Nations     123 

Article  XXIII. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  every 
treaty  or  international  engagement  entered  into 
hereafter  by  any  State  member  of  the  League 
shall  be  forthwith  registered  with  the  Secretary 
General  and  as  soon  as  possible  published  by  him, 
and  that  no  such  treaty  or  international  engage- 
ment shall  be  binding  until  so  registered. 

Article  XXIV. 

It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  body  of  delegates 
from  time  to  time  to  advise  the  reconsideration 
by  States  members  of  the  League  of  treaties 
which  have  become  inapplicable  and  of  interna- 
tional conditions  of  which  the  continuance  may 
endanger  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Article  XXV. 

The  high  contracting  parties  severally  agree 
that  the  present  covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogat- 
ing all  obligations  inter  se  which  are  inconsist- 
ent with  the  terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  engage 
that  they  will  not  hereafter  enter  into  any  en- 
gagement inconsistent  with  the  terms   thereof. 


124  Appendix 


In  case  any  of  the  powers  signatory  hereto  or 
subsequently  admitted  to  the  League  shall,  be- 
fore becoming  a  party  to  this  covenant,  have 
undertaken  any  obligations  which  are  inconsist- 
ent with  the  terms  of  this  covenant,  it  shall  be 
the  duty  of  such  power  to  take  immediate  steps 
to  procure  its  release  from  such  obligations. 

Article  XXVI. 

Amendments  to  this  covenant  will  take  effect 
when  ratified  by  the  States  whose  representa- 
tives compose  the  Executive  Council  and  by 
three-fourths  of  the  States  whose  representa- 
tives compose  the  body  of  delegates. 


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